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COMMENT

CRASHING THE PARTY-THE SUPREME COURT
SUBJECTS POLITICAL PARTIES TO PRECLEARANCE
UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
IN MORSE V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VIRGINIA

I.

INTRODUCTION

If someone told you that whenever a particular "State or
political subdivision" attempts to change its voting laws or
regulations, they must first receive approval from the Department of Justice or a federal court in the District of Columbia,
would you consider this requirement applicable to political parties? Asked in isolation, the question appears too obvious to
warrant serious consideration. An understanding of the history
of discrimination denying America's blacks full and complete
franchise and an understanding of the adoption and evolution
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, however, may give you pause
before answering.
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965' (Act or the
Voting Rights Act) in an attempt to abolish discriminatory
voting practices. Section 5 of the Act contains what is commonly referred to as the Act's preclearance requirement, which provides that certain "covered" jurisdictions must preclear changes
in a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting" with the Attorney

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994). The Voting Rights Act of 1965
"has been hailed by many to be the most effective civil rights legislation ever
passed." S. REP. No. 94-295, at 11 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.CA.N. 774, 777.
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General of the United States or the District Court for the District of Columbia, before implementing the change.2 The Act
has been the subject of much debate, praise, and criticism. It
was adopted as a temporary (and somewhat extraordinary)
measure and it was given continued life by Congress on three
occasions.' The Supreme Court of the United States has made
many pronouncements on the purpose, effect, and scope of its
provisions.4 Numerous commentators have heralded the Act's
requirements. Until recently, however, the judicial gloss given
to the Act's preclearance requirement limited its mandates to
governmental entities. A divided Supreme Court in Morse v.
Republican Party,5 determined that certain changes in a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure with respect to voting" effected by non-governmental entities such as state political parties, must also receive the
blessing of the Justice Department or the federal District Court
for the District of Columbia before being promulgated.'
Part I of this Comment discusses the events leading to, and
in many respects providing the impetus for, the enactment of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Part I also outlines the major
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
3. Many of the Act's requirements, including the preclearance requirement, are
temporary provisions. Congress first extended the temporary provisions of the Voting
Rights Act in 1970. See Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 315 (1970). Congress again
extended the applicability of the Act's temporary provisions in 1975. See Pub. L. No.
94-73, 89 Stat. 400-02 (1975). In 1982, Congress extended the preclearance requirement of Section 5 for twenty-five years. See Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982).
4. For cases discussing the applicability of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
see: Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996); Presley v. Etowah County
Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646 (1991); Pleasant Grove
v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987); NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n,
470 U.S. 166 (1985); McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236 (1984); City of Lockhart v.
United States, 460 U.S. 125 (1983); City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S.
159. (1982); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255 (1982); Blanding v. DuBose, 454 U.S.
393 (1982); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 (1981); City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156 (1980); Dougherty County, Georgia, Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32
(1978); Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190 (1978); United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435
U.S. 110 (1978); Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977); United States v. Board of
Supervisors, 429 U.S. 642 (1977); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976); City of
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656
(1975); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S.
379 (1971); Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544 (1969).
5. 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996) (5-4 decision).
6. Id. at 1192; see discussion infra Part V.
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provisions of the Voting Rights Act, including the preclearance
requirement of Section 5. Part 11 examines the judicial treatment of certain discriminatory voting practices of political parties prior to the adoption of the Voting Rights Act. In particular, Part H discusses the series of Supreme Court decisions
known as the White Primary Cases and the application of the
state action doctrine to political parties to invalidate discriminatory practices under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
to the Constitution. Part 1H analyzes the legislative history of
the Voting Rights Act and the three extensions of the Act's
temporary provisions, giving particular emphasis to congressional intent, or the lack thereof, to include political parties under
Section 5 of the Act. Part IV examines Supreme Court treatment of the Voting Rights Act in general and the preclearance
requirement prior to the Morse decision. Part IV also discusses
the broad interpretation which the Supreme Court has given
Section 5 with regard to the types of governmental entities and
the types of voting changes subject to preclearance. Part V
considers the Supreme Court's most recent Section 5 decision in
Morse and the reasoning the Court used to find the Republican
Party of Virginia subject to the preclearance requirement of
Section 5. Finally, Part VI considers the propriety of the Morse
decision and its impact on future Voting Rights Act litigation.
Perhaps as important as what this Comment discusses is
what it does not discuss. There are two facets of the Morse
decision that are outside the scope of this Comment. The first
is the First Amendment freedom of association concerns regarding the Court's decision to include political parties under Section 5 preclearance. While a majority of the Court determined
that the First Amendment was not implicated by subjecting the
Republican Party of Virginia to Section 5 preclearance, the
issue was nevertheless raised and acknowledged by all five
opinions in Morse.
The second issue that falls outside of the scope of this Comment is the extent to which Section 5 and the constitutional
doctrine of state action are co-extensive. While both issues receive a cursory discussion in this Comment, the reader should
be aware of the fact that these expansive issues warrant consideration when determining whether political parties come
within Section 5's ambit.
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A. Events Leading to the Enactment of the Voting Rights Act
In March of 1965, when Alabama state troopers attacked 525
voting rights demonstrators on the Edmund Pettus Bridge in
Selma, the nation's conscience was raised and the extent to
which black Americans had been denied the franchise became
painfully apparent.7 Selma was targeted by the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and its president, Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., as the place where a growing civil
rights movement could create "a rallying point around which we
can stir the whole nation."8
In addition to anticipating a disproportionate and violent
reaction from the white establishment in Selma, the SCLC
viewed Selma as a vivid portrait of the disenfranchisement
which they sought to reverse. In Dallas County, Alabama, of
which Selma is the county seat, a black person seeking to register to vote, a right which ostensibly had been secured by the
Fifteenth Amendment,9 had to overcome ridiculous obstacles:
the voter registration office was open only two days of the
week; the registration application contained more than fifty
blanks requesting different information; and the applicant was
required to write part of the U.S. Constitution from dictation,
read and answer various questions about the Constitution,
answer questions regarding the structure of the government,
and swear allegiance to the United States and to the State of
Alabama."0 After the events of Bloody Sunday unfolded in
7. See Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965: The Continued Need for Preclearance,51 TENN. L. REV. 1, 25 (1983).
8. Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES
IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7, 14 (Bernard
Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. ('The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
10. See Davidson, supra note 8, at 15; see also HOWARD BALL ET AL, CO&PROMISED COMPLIANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT 237-42 app. B
(1982). Appendix B of COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE contains a literacy test used in
Alabama prior to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Among the sixtyeight questions are: "Of the original 13 states, the one with the largest representation
in the first Congress was _
" Id. at 239. "What words are required by law to be
on all coins and paper currency of the United States?" Id. at 238. 'The Constitution
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Selma, with state troopers attacking the marchers under orders
from Governor George Wallace to "use whatever measures are
necessary" to prevent the demonstration," the legislative
course of securing voting rights was fixed.
In response to the events in Selma, President Lyndon Johnson instructed Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to
draft the "goddamndest toughest" voting rights legislation possible.' Days after the Selma incident, President Johnson addressed a Joint Session of Congress, demanding that the history
of discrimination against America's blacks at the polls be remedied once and for all.'3 The debate in Congress was predictable. With the minds of their constituents indelibly marked by
the scene of black protesters kneeling in prayer on the Edmund
Pettus Bridge, while police armed with billy clubs and tear gas
sent them fleeing, most members of Congress focused on the
details of what was, to them, inevitable. Southern legislators,
however, challenged the constitutionality of the legislation,
raising concerns about what they perceived to be encroachments
on the Tenth Amendment.' 4 Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina described what would become the preclearance requirement
of Section 5 as "an astounding provision. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution undoubtedly reserves to the States the
power to pass laws prescribing qualifications for voters in State
elections."' The sense of paternalism permeating the legislation raised the ire of many opponents. 6
limits the size of the District of Columbia to
" Id. at 240. "After the presidential
electors have voted, to whom do they send the count of their votes?" Id. at 242.
11. Davidson, supra note 8, at 16.
12. Id- at 17.
13. In addressing the Joint Session of Congress that was called just days after
the incident in Selma, President Johnson declared:
At times, history and fate meet at a single time in a single place to
shape a turning point in man's unending search for freedom ....

So it

was last week in Selma, Alabama.... Every device of which human
ingenuity is capable has been used to delay this right [of blacks to
vote)I.... This time, on this issue, there must be no delay, or no hesitation, or no compromise with our purpose.... We have already waited
100 years and more and the time for waiting is gone.
McDonald, supra note 7, at 25 (quoting N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1965, at 30, col. 1).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The Powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
15. 111 CONG. REC. 10,106 (1965).
16. During the floor debate on the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Senator Ervin stat-
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B. The Voting Rights Act: Section 5 Preclearance and Other
Provisions
The resulting Voting Rights Act17 was a comprehensive piece
of legislation that combined a permanent prohibition against
discriminatory voting practices across the nation, with certain
extraordinary, temporary provisions aimed at those southern
states where discrimination against blacks was most prevalent."8 The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982"9 (1982 Senate Report) highlighted the dichotomy between the permanent and temporary
provisions of the Act. The 1982 Senate Report noted that the

ed that the legislation was "utterly repugnant to the basic principles upon which our
system of justice rests." 111 CONG. REC. 10,102 (1965). In a speech which received
much praise from his fellow Southern Senators, Senator Ervin described what he
perceived to be the unconstitutionality of the preclearance requirement: "It would certainly be a tragic thing if everyone were going to be condemned if he could not show
he was not going to sin in the future. And yet, that is the burden put on a State or
political subdivision of a State condemned by the artificial formula [of § 4(b)]." 111
CONG. REC. 10,111 (1965).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994).
18. President Johnson referred to the Act as a "triumph for freedom as huge as
any ever won on any battlefield." S. REP. No. 97-417 at 4 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.CAN. 177, 181. Currently the following States are "covered" under § 4(b) of
the Voting Rights Act for preclearance purposes: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. In addition, certain counties or other units of local government are covered in the following States: California,
Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota. 28
C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (1996); see also Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1249 (1989). In his article, McDonald explains
what Congress sought to accomplish through this unusual approach to securing civil
rights in a discriminatory society:
Although the 1965 Act had provisions that applied nationwide, Congress
intentionally targeted seven states of the old Confederacy-Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and portions of
North Carolina-for the application of unique and stringent measures
described by the Supreme Court as the "heart of the Act." [quoting South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1965)]. The new measures
suspended discriminatory literacy and other tests which had been used to
deny blacks the vote. The Act also prohibited the affected jurisdictions
from enacting any new discriminatory laws by requiring them for a period of five years to pre-clear all changes in their election practices with
federal officials.
Id. at 1250.
19. S. REP. No. 417, 97-417 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. 177.
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"Voting Rights Act was designed to operate on two levels." 0
On the first level, Section 4 of the Act targeted certain jurisdictions in which less than half of the electorate was registered
to vote or had voted, and which had employed either literacy
tests or similar devices to stifle black franchise. Section 5 of the
Act operated on this first level to ensure that such "covered"
jurisdictions precleared any changes in voting with the Justice
Department or the District Court for the District of Columbia.
On the second level, the Voting Rights Act prescribed a nationwide prohibition against discriminatory voting practices.2"
Section 2 of the Act provides that
[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied in
any State or political subdivision in a manner which results
in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or [membership in a language minority].. .'

The purpose of Section 2 is to ban any and all voting practices nationwide that result in the denial or abridgement of the
right to vote based on the specified discriminatory factors. Section 2 also provides the manner by which a violation of its
provisions may be established.'
20. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 182.
21. See id. at 5-6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 182-83.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994); see also Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (1984)
(amending Section 2(a) to include the "results" test with respect to establishing a
violation of the prohibition against discriminatory voting practices); McDonald, supra
note 7, at 28. McDonald explains that after a plurality of the Supreme Court concluded in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), that a plaintiff must prove a
racial purpose as a prerequisite to establish a violation of both the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, and that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was "intended to
have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself," Bolden, 446
U.S. at 61, Congress amended Section 2 "in order to make clear that whatever the
standard of proof in constitutional challenges was, proof of racial purpose was not
required for a statutory violation." Id. at 28; Mark E. Haddad, Note, Getting Results
Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE LIJ. 139 (1984).
23. Under Section 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act, a violation is established "if,
based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes
leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally
open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection
(a) . ..
in that its members have less opportunity ...
to participate in the electoral
process and to elect representatives of their choice." Subsection (b) of Section 2 further provides that "Itlhe extent to which members of a protected class have been
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Under Section 4 of the Act, Congress banned the use of tests
or devices in determining eligibility to vote.' When Congress
first adopted the Voting Rights Act, it took the incremental step
of banning literacy and other tests under Section 4 only in
those jurisdictions which satisfied the Section 5 conditions necessary to be considered a "covered" jurisdiction.' When the
temporary provisions of the Act first came before Congress for
renewal in 1970, Congress banned such tests nationwide and
extended the ban for five years.26 In 1975 Congress made the
ban permanent."
Section 4(b) of the Act provides the manner by which a jurisdiction is considered to be "covered" for the purposes of Section
5's preclearance requirement. A "covered" jurisdiction is one
that maintained "any test or device"' with respect to voting
on November 1, 1964, and in which less than fifty percent of
the State residents of voting age were registered to vote on
November 1, 1964.29 Congress amended the Voting Rights Act
in 1970 and 1975 to include jurisdictions which had in place
any test or device regarding voting and in which less than fifty
percent of the electorate were registered to vote as of November
1, 1968 or November 1, 1972, respectively."
Other permanent provisions of the Act include the authority
of the Attorney General to appoint federal election examiners to
covered jurisdictions under specified conditions.31 Moreover, the
Attorney General has the authority to send federal examiners
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may
be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population." 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994).
25. See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (1965).
26. See Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 315 (1970).
27. See Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400-02 (1975). See McDonald, supra note 7, at
28.
28. See generally McDonald, supra note 7, at 31 (explaining that "the term 'test
or device' includes literacy tests, educational requirements, good character tests, and
exclusively English language registration procedures or elections where a single linguistic minority comprises more than 5 percent of the voting age population of the
jurisdiction.").
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1994).
30. See id. See supra note 18 for a list of states and jurisdictions meeting the
requirements of § 4(b) today.
31. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973d, 1973f (1994).
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to other jurisdictions which are not "covered" under Section 4(b)
when certain conditions are met; this is the so-called "pocket
trigger" provision of the Voting Rights Act.32
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, often referred to as the
"heart of the Act,"' requires "covered" States or political subdivisions to preclear "any voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" different than that in effect in that State or political subdivision on either November 1 of 1964, 1968, or 1972 with the
District Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney
General of the United States.' The Supreme Court has consistently given a liberal interpretation to the preclearance requirement. The term political subdivision includes any governmental
32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a(a), 1973(c) (1994). By providing the Attorney General
with the authority to appoint federal election examiners to any jurisdiction in the
country "Congress designed [S]ection 3 to reach pockets of discrimination in jurisdictions not otherwise covered by Section 5. Any federal court that has found a violation
of voting rights protected by the [Flourteenth or [F]ifteenth [A]mendments may apply
the provisions of Section 5." McDonald, supra note 7, at 29-30.
33. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1965).
34. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, provides that whenever a covered state or political subdivision:
shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite
to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964... such State or
subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color or in contravention of the guarantees set
forth in section 1973b(f)(2) [membership in a language minority] of this
title, and unless and until the court enters such judgement no person
shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That
such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be
enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer
or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney
General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within
sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate
an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be
made.

42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
Section 5 is a temporary provision. In 1982, Congress voted to extend the coverage of Section 5 for a period of twenty-five years. Accordingly, Section 5 will expire
in the year 2007. See Pub. L. No. 97-205(8), 96 Stat. 133(8) (1982).
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entity "having power over any aspect of the electoral process
within designated jurisdictions ...." The Supreme Court has
also read the scope of the preclearance requirement to include
virtually 3all
changes in election laws or practices that pertain
6

to voting.

Under Section 5, a State or political subdivision, as defined
by the Act, 7 may receive preclearance of a change in voting
either judicially or administratively. Under the administrative
route, the submission must meet certain conditions of specificity
as prescribed by Department of Justice regulations.38 Prior to
the adoption of the Attorney General's regulation governing the
content of submissions, the Supreme Court determined that the
Voting Rights Act required the State or political subdivision to
"submit any legislation or regulation" in an "unambiguous and
recordable manner."39 The jurisdiction making the submission
has the burden of establishing that the change in voting "does
not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color ... .0
The District Court for the District of Columbia defined the

35. United States v. Board of Comm'r, 435 U.S. 110, 118 (1978); see also 42
U.S.C. § 19731(c)(2) (1994) (defining political subdivision as "any county or parish,
except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a
county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting."). In Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996)
the Supreme Court held for the first time that a non-governmental entity may be
subject to the Act's preclearance requirement. See discussion infra Part V.
36. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-68 (1969) (holding that
"Congress intended to reach any state enactment which alters the election law of a
covered state in even a minor way.").
37. See sources cited supra note 35 (defining political subdivision); see also 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-l(h), 1973bb-1 (1994) (defining a "State" as each of the several
states and the District of Columbia).
38. Se6 28 C.F.R. § 51.27 (1996). When submitting a proposed change under this
regulation, the submitting party must explain, among other requirements, the reasons
for the change and any potential effect which the change may have on minorities. Id.
39. Allen, 393 U.S. at 571.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994); see also McDonald, supra note 7, at 37-38. McDonald explains that this burden shifting is an essential component of Section 5's effectiveness. He notes that the Supreme Court upheld this allocation of the burden of
proof in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966), and "has consistently applied it ever since." Id at 37 (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 183 n.18 (1980); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538 n.9 (1973)). McDonald further explains that not "surprisingly many Section 5 submissions turn on the
failure of the jurisdiction to carry its burden of proof, rather than on a positive finding of discrimination by the courts or the Attorney General." I& at 37-38.
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purpose or effect standard under Section 5 as "the sort of invidious discriminatory purpose that would support a challenge to
official action as an unconstitutional denial of equal protection."4 '
II. POLITICAL PARTIES AND JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE
RIGHT TO VOTE PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS AcT-THE WHITE PRIMARY CASES

A. The Rise and Fall of Black FranchiseDuring Reconstruction
The Civil War Amendments to the Constitution 2 did little
to secure full and complete franchise for America's black citizens. While blacks enjoyed the right to vote at the outset of
Reconstruction, southern whites devised new and ingenious
schemes to perpetuate the systematic disenfranchisement that
had been a part of the nation's early history.' At the outset of
41. Mississippi v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569, 583 (D.D.C. 1979); see McDonald, supra note 7, at 39-45, for a good discussion of the purpose or effect standard of
Section 5 and the Supreme Courtes interpretation of it.
42. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution are commonly referred to as the Civil War Amendments. These amendments were proposed in the aftermath of the Civil War and were all ratified by 1870.
The Civil War Amendments "are closely tied to the earlier abolitionist movement and
the post war struggle concerning the rights of freed blacks." JoHN E. NOWAK ET AL.,
CONSTrruTrONAL LAW § 14.7, at 642 (5th ed. 1995).
The Thirteenth Amendment provides that: "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment states
that: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Under
the Fifteenth Amendment the right to vote is guaranteed: "Section 1. The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
43. See Davidson, supra note 8, at 10. In his article, Davidson notes that,
Among the measures employed by southern white conservatives to undermine the Civil War amendments were violence, voting fraud, white
officials' discriminatory use of election structures (such as gerrymandering
and the use of at-large elections to prevent black officeholding), statutory
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Reconstruction, blacks took advantage of their newly protected
constitutional right to vote. "At the high point of southern black
voting during Reconstruction, about two-thirds of eligible black
males cast ballots in presidential and gubernatorial contests."'
Perhaps more troubling to the advocates of continued disenfranchisement was the impact of black suffrage on the outcome
of the elections in which blacks exercised their vote. A natural
outgrowth of the newly found black suffrage was a dramatic
increase in the number of black candidates elected to Congress
and the southern state legislatures. In 1870, eleven of the former Confederate states elected 264 blacks to Congress and their
various state legislatures.' A century later, in 1970, when the
Voting Rights Act was being extended for the first time, that
number had dropped precipitously to forty.' When Reconstruction came to an end and the Jim Crow regime sprang to life,
devices such as disenfranchising conventions quickly reversed
the advances which blacks had made at the ballot box. By the
turn of the century, black representation in Congress and in
the southern state houses had become virtually non-existent.'
B. The Supreme Court Fights Back--Southern Intransigence
Versus the Guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments
1. The Early White Primary Cases
Against this backdrop the Supreme Court confronted the
issue of just how enforceable the Fifteenth Amendment' was
going to be. As expected, because of the eventual need for a
legislative remedy in the form of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
suffrage restrictions, and, in the waning years of the century, revision of
"reconstructed" state constitutions to effect disfranchisement.

Id.
44. Id.

45. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions,
in CONTROVERSIES IN MiNORiTY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE
135, 140 tbl. I (Bernard Grofnan & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
46. See id
47. See id In contrast to the peak of black representation in 1872, with 324
blacks serving in either Congress or southern state legislatures, by 1900, with disenfranchisement efforts at full force, the number had decreased to five. See id.
48. U.S. CoNST. amend. XV.
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the will of southern intransigents often prevailed over the case
specific remedies provided by the judicial forum. The House
Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the Voting Rights
Act reflected the judicial inability to effectively secure the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment.49
Prior to the adoption of the Voting Rights Act, enforcement of
the Fifteenth Amendment had been sporadic and ineffective. In
a series of decisions known as the White Primary Cases," the
Supreme Court applied the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to invalidate a variety of discriminatory voting practices.
In particular, the White Primary Cases concerned discriminatory
voting practices in the context of the political party.
In the first of these cases, Nixon v. Herndon,5 the Democratic Party of Texas refused to allow Nixon, a black voter, to
cast a ballot in the primary election for the nomination of Democratic candidates to the United States Senate and House of
Representatives. The Party relied on a state statute which provided that "in no event shall a Negro be eligible to participate
in a Democratic party primary election to be held in the State
of Texas." 2 The Attorney General of Texas argued that "the
right to vote referred to in constitutions, and elections mentioned therein, do not include within their scope all elections
and all voting by persons in the United States."53 Rejecting

49. H.R. REP. No. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N, 2437, 2439-44.
The House Judiciary Committee Report on the Voting Rights Act of 1965 explained
that "[trhe history of the 15th Amendment litigation in the Supreme Court reveals
both the variety of means used to bar Negro voting and the durability of such discriminatory practices." Id. reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.CJAN. 2437, 2439. The report went
on to note that "[pirogress has been painfully slow, in part because of the intransigence of State and local officials and repeated delays in the judicial process.... The
judicial process affords those who are determined to resist plentiful opportunity to resist.... Such experience amply demonstrates that the case-by-case approach has
been unsatisfactory." Id. reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.AN. 2437, 2439-41.
50. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932);
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). For an excellent discussion of the White Primary Cases in general and the issue of the state action doctrine as it applies to political
parties, see Arthur M. Weisburd, Candidate-Making and the Constitution: Constitutional Restraints on and Protections of Party Nominating Methods, 57 S. CAL. L. REV.
213 (1984).
51. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
52. Id. at 540.
53. Id. at 538.
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Texas' contention that the question presented was a political
rather than a legal one, Justice Holmes belied the purported
distinction between the primary and general election:
If the defendant's conduct was a wrong to the plaintiff the
same reasons that allow a recovery for denying the plaintiff
a vote at a final election allow it for denying a vote at the
primary election that may determine the final result."
Moreover, in addressing the constitutionality of the statute, the
Court held that it was "unnecessary to consider the Fifteenth
Amendment, because it seems..,
hard to imagine a more
direct and obvious infringement of the Fourteenth."55
In response to the Supreme Court's decision, the Texas legislature enacted a statute which more obliquely accomplished the
same objectives as the one the Court found so blatantly discriminatory in Nixon v. Herndon. The new statute granted to
the Executive Committees of Texas' political parties the power
to determine for themselves the qualifications of their members.
The statute, passed as an "emergency" measure, provided that
the parties "shall in [their] own way determine who shall be
qualified to vote or otherwise participate in such political par-

54. Id. at 540. The Supreme Court, in Morse v. Republican Party 116 S. Ct. 1186
(1996), repeatedly discounted the distinction between the primary election and the
nominating convention. Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in Morse noted that the

Court had "previously recognized that [Section] 5 extends to changes affecting nomination processes other than the primary." Id. at 1199. Furthermore, Justice Stevens
explained that in previous cases the Court has been "unconcerned that the changes
did not directly relate to the conduct of a primary, because they had an effect on the
general election." Id. The concurring opinion in Morse also expressed the view that
the superficial distinctions between the primary and the nominating convention were
not significant in terms of resolving the question of whether Section 5 applied to the
Republican Party of Virginia's convention because, "the case before us involves a
nominating convention that resembles a primary about as closely as one could imagine." Id. at 1214 (Breyer, J., concurring). Speaking in terms remarkably similar to
Justice Holmes in Nixon v. Condon, the Morse Court commented that regardless of
the label attached to the nominating process, the damage to the excluded voter remains the same:
To the excluded voter who cannot cast a vote for his or her candidate, it
is all the same whether the party conducts its nomination by a primary
or by a convention open to all the party members except those kept out
by the filing fee. Each is an "integral part of the election machinery."
Id. at 1200 (citation omitted).
55. Herndon, 273 U.S. at 540-41.
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Mr. Nixon was again refused the right to vote in a

primary election, but this time it was under the auspices of a
resolution adopted by the Democratic Party of Texas and the
authority of the new statute, which provided that "all white
democrats who are qualified under the constitution and laws of
Texas ... and none other, [shall] be allowed to participate in
the primary elections .... ."7

In disposing of the issue, the Supreme Court in Condon58
held that the State's delegation of authority to the Party to
determine its membership transformed the party into the "governmental instruments whereby parties are organized and regulated to the end that government itself may be established or
continued."59 The Court invoked the doctrine of state action,
articulated in the Civil Rights Cases,0 under which the terms
of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to governmental entities,
but not to private actors:
The pith of the matter is simply this, that when those
agencies are invested with an authority independent of the
will of the association in whose name they undertake to
speak, they become to that extent the organs of the State
itself, the repositories of official power... . They are not
acting in matters of merely private concern like the directors or agents of business corporations. They are acting in
matters of high public interest, matters intimately connected with the capacity of government to exercise its functions
unbrokenly and smoothly. 1
Accordingly, the Court held that under the Fourteenth Amend-

56. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932).
57. Id. at 82.
58. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
59. Id. at 88.
60. 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see Ronna Greff Schneider, The 1982 State Action 7rilogy:
Doctrinal Contraction, Confusion, and a Proposal for Change, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1150, 1150 n.1 (1985) (noting that while the Civil Rights Cases have been most frequently cited for the proposition that the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment
apply to governmental entities rather than private actors, the Supreme Court "had
previously established the public/private distinction in United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629 (1882); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313 (1879); and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).").
61. Condon, 286 U.S. at 88.
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ment, it was charged with the duty of leveling "these barriers
of color."62
Dissenting in Condon, Justice McReynolds challenged the
state action doctrine applied by the Court to political parties,
which by their very nature are voluntary associations. In so
doing, Justice McReynolds addressed what he perceived to be
the implications of the Court's decision:
If statutory recognition of the authority of a political party
through its Executive Committee to determine who shall
participate therein gives to the resolves of such party or
committee the character and effect of action by the State, of
course the same rule must apply when party conventions
are so treated; and it would be difficult to logically deny
like effect to the rules and by-laws of social or business
clubs, corporations, and religious associations, etc., organized under charters or general enactments. The State acts
through duly qualified officers and not through the representatives of mere voluntary associations.'
The first two White Primary Cases illustrate the concerns
Congress expressed when debating the merits of Section 5's
preclearance requirement in 1965.' Congress viewed the White
Primary Cases as evidence of the need for a legislative remedy
in the form of preclearance to do what court decrees had proven
incapable of doing: preventing the implementation of discriminatory voting practices in those jurisdictions where disenfranchisement was the rule rather than the exception. 5 Consider
the testimony of President Johnson's Attorney General, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, the principal author of the Voting Rights

62. Id. at 89.
63. Id. at 103-04 (McReynolds, J., dissenting);. see infra Part V. Justice Thomas,
dissenting in Morse, argued that political parties are not agents of the state simply
because they take advantage of favorable state law. In rejecting the Court's reliance
on the state action doctrine to find the actions of the Party subject to Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act, Justice Thomas argued that when the Party exercised its
rights under state law to choose its method of nomination, that decision did not
amount to "state action." "[Exercise of the choice allowed by the state law where the
initiative comes from it and not from the State, does not make its action in doing so
'state action.' Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1233 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974)).
64. See supra note 48 and infra Part HI.
65. See infra note 113.
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Act. Attorney General Katzenbach articulated the inherent
limitations on judicial enforcement of the right to vote in a
discriminatory society: "even in those jurisdictions where judgment is finally won, local officials intent upon evading the spirit of the law are adept at devising new discriminatory techniques not covered by the letter of the judgment."6 As the
White Primary Cases evolved, the sentiment expressed by Attorney General Katzenbach became even more pronounced.
The state of the law after the first two White Primary Cases
seemed relatively clear. State statutory authorization for a
political party to determine the composition of its membership
was sufficient to make the political party a state actor with
respect to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the Court looked beyond formalities; it considered the
distinctions between the primary election and the general election insignificant for constitutional purposes. Perhaps underestimating the persistence of the Democratic Party of Texas, the
Supreme Court muddied the waters just four years later when
it was confronted once again with discriminatory voting practices in the context of the political party.
2. Grovey v. Townsend: A Temporary Setback
In spite of the soundness and logic of the first of the White
Primary Cases, the Supreme Court retreated soon thereafter in
its enforcement of the liberties of the Fifteenth Amendment. In
7 a unanimous Supreme Court exalted
Grovey v. Townsend,"
form over substance by holding that the Texas Democratic Party did not act as an organ of the state when, in the absence of
any statutory authority, it limited party membership to white
males only. The Court noted that the Party's action was "upon
its face ...

not state action."6

The petitioner argued that while no state statute prescribed
the manner or authority of Texas' political parties to select
their membership, state regulation of the primary election re-

66. McDonald, supra note 7, at 25 (quoting Hearings on S. 1564 before the Senate

Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. pt. 1, at 14 (1965)).
67. 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
68. Id. at 48.
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sulted in regulation of those elections as fully as the general
elections. Thus, those persons conducting primary elections
were "subject to state direction and control and as such were
state actors for constitutional purposes."6 9 In response, the
Supreme Court deferred to pronouncements by the Supreme
Court of Texas, in concluding that despite the regulation of the
primary election process, the state had not attempted "to prescribe or to limit the membership of a political party .... .o
Finally, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that in
Texas, a nomination by the Democratic Party was the equivalent of election to the office itself. Noting that a person cannot,
under the terms of the Federal Constitution, be denied the
right to cast a vote at the general election, the Court nevertheless drew a distinction between the exercise of that right and
the right of voluntary organizations to choose the composition of
their members. 7 '

69. Id. at 50. Texas statutory law regulated nearly every facet of the primary
election, save the manner by which political parties were able to select their membership. Among the requirements regarding the conduct of primary elections, the statutes
provided that: every party whose members cast more than 100,000 votes in the previous election was required to elect its candidates at a primary election; the same
qualifications for voting in general elections were required for voting in primary
elections; the form of ballot for primary elections was specified in the Texas Code;
the use of ballot boxes and voting booths was regulated by statute; etc. See id. at 4950.
70. I& at 52-53.
71. Id, at 54-55.
A similar situation may exist in other states where one or another party
includes a great majority of the qualified electors. The argument is that
as a negro may not be denied a ballot at a general election on account
of his race or color, if exclusion from the primary renders his vote at the
general election insignificant and useless, the result is to deny him the
suffrage altogether. So to say is to confuse the privilege of membership
in a party with the right to vote for one who is to hold a public office.
With the former the state need have no concern, with the latter it is
bound to concern itself, for the general election is a function of the state
government and discrimination by the state as respects participation by
negroes on account of their race or color is prohibited by the Federal
Constitution.
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3. The Supreme Court's Growing Impatience: Rejection of the
White Primary
The Court's decision in Grovey was short lived. Nine years
later, the Supreme Court overruled Grovey in Smith v.
Allwright.72 In Smith, the Texas Democratic Party denied a
black citizen the right to vote in a Democratic primary for the
United States Senate and House of Representatives, the governorship, and other state offices. The basis for refusing petitioner the vote was again a resolution adopted by the Party
providing that "all white citizens of the State of Texas who are
qualified to vote under the Constitution and laws of the State
shall be eligible to membership in the Democratic party, and,
as such, entitled to participate in its deliberations."73
Since the Grovey decision, the Court had decided United
States v. Classic,74 holding Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution 75 gave Congress the authority to regulate primary elections as well as general elections "where the primary is by law

72. 321 U.S. 649 (1944); see David A. Strauss, State Action After the Civil Rights
Era, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 409, 409-10 (1993). In his article Strauss notes that
during the 1940s through the 1960s the "great state action cases ... involved not
just an incidental act of discrimination but an integral aspect of a broad discriminatory and segregationist regime." Id Moreover, the discriminatory practices were generally defended on the basis that they were the action of private parties rather than the
government. Strauss explains that
[i]n this context the state action doctrine came to be seen by many as an
accomplice to racism. Charles Blacls great article on the subject expressed this view: [The state action doctrine] now exists principally as a
hope in the minds of racists (whether for love or profit) that "somewhere,
somehow, to some extent" community organization of racial discrimination
can be so featly [sic] managed as to force the Court admiringly to confess
that this time it cannot tell where the pea is hidden ....
The amenability of racial injustice to national legal correction is inversely proportional to the durability and scope of the state action "doctrine," and of
the ways of thinking to which it is linked.
Id. at 410 (quoting Charles L Black, Jr., The Supreme Court 1966 Term-Foreword:
"StateAction," Equal Protection, and California'sProposition14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69,
95, 70 (1970)).
73. Smith, 321 U.S. at 656-57.
74. 313 U.S 299 (1941).
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.").
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made an integral part of the election machinery." 6 While Classic dealt with issues of election fraud, the Smith Court found
that it had a direct bearing on Grovey,
not because exclusion of Negroes from primaries is any
more or less state action by reason of the unitary character
of the electoral process but because the recognition of the
place of the primary in the electoral scheme makes clear
that state delegation to a party of the power to fix the
qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state
function
that may make the party's action the action of the
77
State.
Noting that the determinative factor in deciding the question
presented remained whether the "exclusionary action of the
party was the action of the State," the Smith Court found that
the nature and extent of the State's regulation of the primary
process and the State's delegation of the authority to conduct
primary elections to the political parties were sufficient to conclude that the party's action was the action of the State. 8
"Primary elections are conducted by the party under state statutory authority."7' The parties "certify [their] candidates to the
appropriate officers for inclusion on the official ballot for the
general election."s' "No name which has not been so certified
may appear upon the ballot for the general election as a candidate of a political party.""' "[T]his statutory system for the selection of party nominees for inclusion on the general election
ballot makes the party which is required to follow these legisla-

76. Classic, 313 U.S at 318.
77. Smith, 321 U.S. at 660 (emphasis added); see also id. at 653 n.6 (detailing
the Texas statutory scheme and its comprehensive regulation of the primary process).
In Morse, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, examined the relevant Virginia statutes in a manner similar to the Smith Court's analysis. Justice Stevens noted in
Morse that it is not the extent of the state regulation of the political party which
necessarily renders the party's activities those of the state for constitutional purposes.
Instead, it is the state statutory delegation of authority over a matter traditionally
reserved to the state itself, here the electoral process, combined with the Court's
understanding of the importance of the primary in the electoral scheme, that establishes state action on the part of the private actor. Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S.
Ct. 1186, 1196 n.17 (1996).
78. Smith, 321 U.S. at 661.
79. Id. at 663.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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rive directions an agency of the State in so far as it determines
the participants in a primary election."82 Accordingly, the
party's exclusion of petitioner from participation in the primary
on account of his race violated the Fifteenth Amendment.
Terry v. Adams,'s the last of the White Primary Cases, presented the Court with yet another attempt by Texas Democrats
to exclude blacks from casting their votes in the nomination
process. Terry gave more credence to earlier contentions that in
the Texas political climate, the nominating process, rather than
the general election, is what counts.' In Terry the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of certain voting practices
of the Texas Jaybird Association, which in name was not a
political party and was not subject to any state regulation
whatsoever. The Jaybird Association conducted a "pre-primary"
of sorts, whereby its members (usually the same as the Democratic Party of Texas) voted for candidates to be placed on the
primary ballot as part of the Democratic Party's ticket for nomination to the general election. The Jaybird Association limited
its membership to whites only. The Court looked beyond the
purported independence of the Jaybird Association and found,
that while it professed to be simply a group of politically like-

82. Id. at 663. The Smith court elaborated on the application of the state action
doctrine in the context of this factual situation:
When primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing offi. as they have here, the same tests to determine the character
cials ...
of discrimination or abridgement should be applied to the primary as are
applied to the general election. If the State requires a certain electoral
it endorses, adopts and enforces the discrimination against
procedure ...
Negroes, practiced by a party entrusted by Texas law with the determination of the qualifications of participants in the primary. This is state

action within the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment....
The privilege of membership in a party may be, as this Court said
in Grovey v. Townsend, no concern of a State. But when, as here, that

privilege is also the essential qualification for voting in a primary to
select nominees for a general election, the State makes the action of the
party the action of the State.
Id. at 664-65 (citations omitted); see infra Part V. In Morse, Justice Stevens relied on

what he considered to be the statutory delegation of authority to political parties of
the right to decide "who will appear on the general election ballot" in concluding that
the Republican Party of Virginia was subject to Section 5's preclearance requirement.
Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1194.

83. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
84. See Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); supra note 70 and accompanying
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minded citizens conducting "pre-primaries" to select candidates
who would then run in the primary election, it had in fact
"become an integral part ...

of the elective process."' Despite

the trappings of the Jaybird Association, the Court found that
the "party has been the dominant political group in the county
since organization, having endorsed every county-wide official
elected since 1889." 86
Although there was no majority opinion in Terry, eight of the
Justices concluded that the Jaybirds' exclusion of blacks from
voting in their primaries violated the Fifteenth Amendment."
The Court rejected the claim that the three-step process which
a Jaybird candidate had to follow in order to win the general
election (i.e., the Jaybird pre-primary, the Democratic primary,
and the general election) differed, for purposes of constitutional
significance, from the traditional two-step process. The Court
noted that "such a variation in the result from so slight a
change in form" does not insulate the Jaybirds from constitutional scrutiny."
Justice Black, joined by two other Justices, held that the
Jaybird Association violated the Fifteenth Amendment when it
excluded blacks from participating in the "only election that
counted." 9 Because the Jaybird primary was such an "integral
part ...

of the elective process," Justice Black reasoned that

the "Democratic primary and the general election have become
no more than the perfunctory ratifiers of the choice that has
already been made in the Jaybird elections from which Negroes
have been excluded."90 While not concerned so much with the
level of state involvement in the Jaybird process, for ostensibly
there was no positive state involvement, Justice Black concluded that the Jaybird primary was nevertheless subject to the

85. Id. at 469. The Court further noted that in reality the Jaybird Association
was no different from a political party. The membership of the association was limited to whites only; it was run like other political parties "with an executive committee
named from the county's voting precincts;" Jaybird candidates invariably entered the
Democratic primaries and generally ran and won without any opposition for the Democratic nomination; etc. Id, at 463.

86. Id. at 463.
87. Id. at 470.
88. Id. at 465-66 n.1 (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661 (1944)).

89. Terry, 345 U.S. at 469.
90. Id.
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prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment: "The effect of the
whole procedure, Jaybird primary plus Democratic primary plus
general election, is to do precisely that which the Fifteenth
Amendment forbids-strip Negroes of every vestige of influence
in selecting the officials who control the local county matters
that intimately touch the daily lives of citizens."9 '
As part of the concern regarding the practical aspects of the
Jaybird's influence in the political climate, Justice Black defined the scope of "elections" with reference to the mandates of
the Fifteenth Amendment, prior case law, and a congressional
enactment pursuant to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.9 2 Justice Black noted that [c]learly the Amendment includes any election in which public issues are decided or public
officials selected." Justice Black did not receive support for
this proposition from a majority of the Court.
Justice Frankfurter, writing alone, concluded that it was not
so much the practical implications of the Jaybirds exclusion of
blacks from the Jaybird primary that assumed Constitutional
significance but rather the state action doctrine that served to
prohibit the exclusionary activity.94 Justice Frankfurter found
that the Jaybirds acted as agents of the state when the state
acquiesced to Jaybird activities:
The exclusion of the Negroes from meaningful participation
in the only primary scheme set up by the State was not an
accidental, unsought consequence of the exercise of civic
rights by voters to make their common viewpoint count. It
was the design, the very purpose of the arrangement that
the Jaybird primary... exclude Negro participation ....
That it was the action in part of the election officials

91. Id. at 469-70.
92. See id. at 466-69. In 1870, Congress provided that:
All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to
vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or other territorial
subdivision, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections,
without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any
constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory,
or by or under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding.
8 U.S.C. § 31 (1870) (recodifled at 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(1) (1994)).
93. Terry, 345 U.S. at 468.
94. See id. at 476.
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charged by Texas law with the fair administration of the
primaries, brings it within the reach of the law.95
Joined by three members of the Court, Justice Clark combined the reasoning of Justices Black and Frankfurter and
concluded that both the practical role played by the Jaybird
primary and the delegation of state authority to the Jaybirds
brought their actions within the prohibitions of the Fifteenth
Amendment." Justice Clark noted that while the Democratic
primary and the general election were indeed open to all, the
reality of the Jaybird primary was to nullify the vote of blacks
"at the sole stage of the local political process where the bargaining and interplay of rival political forces would make it
count."" The practical results of the Jaybird primary led Justice Clark to conclude that the state action doctrine was properly invoked in this instance. 8 Thus, the actions of the Jaybirds
were also those of the state. "When a state structures its electoral apparatus in a form which devolves upon a political organization the uncontested choice of public officials, that organization itself, in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of
government which draw the Constitution's safeguards into
9
play."9
The White Primary Cases stand for the proposition that certain political party actions can violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment. Thus, prior to the enactment of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, the Supreme Court held that the prohibitions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were applicable to political parties via the state action doctrine. Discriminatory political party activities are not shielded from constitutional scrutiny when the political party's actions form an integral part of the electoral machinery.
Interestingly, the Morse Court, in holding the Republican
Party of Virginia subject to the provisions of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, relied on both rationales expressed in Ter-

95. Id. at 476-77 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
96. See id. at 481-82 (Clark, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 484 (Clark, J., concurring).
98. See id. (Clark, J., concurring).
99. Id. (Clark, J., concurring) (citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664
(1944)).
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ry.'1 The Morse Court was unconcerned with the actual distinctions between the primary and other forms of nomination.
To those members of the Morse Court finding the Party subject
to preclearance, the contrast between the primary and the nominating convention, like the differences between the Jaybird
primary and the actual primary, was a distinction without a
difference. Similarly, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in
Morse, found that the Commonwealth of Virginia, through its
statutory scheme, delegated authority to the political parties in
Virginia.'" Thus, the actions of the Virginia political parties
were the actions of the state for constitutional purposes and for
the purposes of Section 5 coverage as well.0 2
While the White Primary Cases subject political parties to
constitutional scrutiny under the state action doctrine, the relationship between the White Primary Cases and Section 5's
preclearance requirements of is less clear. Applying the principles of Smith v. Allwright, °3 the Morse Court concluded that
the Republican Party of Virginia was a state actor when it
charged the delegate filing fee, thereby subjecting it to
preclearance under Section 5.', The dissent in Morse argued
that the state action doctrine and the terms of Section 5 were
not necessarily coterminous. As such, the Morse dissent asserted that the state action doctrine of the White Primay Cases did
not necessarily bring the Republican Party of Virginia within
the mandates of Section 5.105

HI. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
AND CONGRESSIONAL EXTENSIONS OF THE ACT'S

PRECLEARANCE REQUIREMENT

A. The Need for Statutory Enforcement of the Fifteenth
Amendment-Congressional Findings
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act with several per-

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See
See
See
321
See
See

Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996).
id. at 1193-94.
id. at 1198.
U.S. 649 (1944).
Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1206.
id. at 1219.
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manent provisions aimed at securing the rights of the Fifteenth
Amendment for all of America's citizens regardless of the color
of their skin. Numerous other provisions, including Section 5,
were regarded as temporary provisions, aimed at certain voting
practices in select parts of the country where disenfranchisement and discriminatory voting practices were most preva10
lent.
When Congress first considered the Voting Rights Act, the
debate focused more on "how" statutory enforcement of the
rights embodied in the Fifteenth Amendment should be accomplished rather than on "whether" such congressional action was
necessary and appropriate.'
While the congressional discussion regarding the exact scope and purpose of Section 5 was
limited,' ° certain pronouncements lead to the conclusion that
Congress meant to reverse, in the broadest possible fashion,
discrimination at the ballot box."° Congress, in addition to
recognizing its responsibility to enforce the guarantees of the
Fifteenth Amendment, noted that "[tlhe historic struggle for the
realization of this constitutional guarantee indicates clearly that
our national achievements in this area have fallen far short of
our aspirations.""0
Congress premised much of its justification for the necessity
of the Voting Rights Act on the ineffectiveness of the case-bycase method of enforcing the rights embodied in the Fifteenth

106. See supra Part I.B.; Laughlin McDonald, Racial Fairness-Why Shouldn't it
Apply to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?, 21 STETSON L. REv. 847, 849 (1992)
("When it was enacted in 1965, section 5 was a temporary, five year measure and
applied primarily in the South where discrimination in voting against African-Americans had been particularly blatant and systematic.").
107. See supra Part I.A.
108. See Scott Gluck, Congressional Reaction to Judicial Construction of Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 337, 355-56 (1996).
In his article, Gluck provides a thorough description and analysis of the legislative
history of the 1965 Act and the 1970 and 1975 extensions of the Voting Rights Act.
For a brief discussion of the legislative history of the 1982 extension of the Act, see
Timothy G. O'Rourke, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982: The New Bailout Provision and Virginia, 69 VA. L. REV. 765 (1983).
109. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-15 (1966) (discussing the
"voluminous" legislative history of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Allen v. State Bd.
of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566 (1969) (holding that "[tihe legislative history on the
whole supports the view that Congress intended to reach any State enactment which
altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way.").
110. H.R. REP. No. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.CAN. 2437, 2439.
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Amendment."' This case-by-case method "reveal[ed] both the
variety of means used to bar Negro voting and the durability of
such discriminatory policies."" The judicial forum presented
two distinct problems in enforcing the right to vote. First, judicial remedies were often not sufficient to adequately redress the
discriminatory practices which the courts sought to enjoin. As
the House Judiciary Committee Report on the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 (1965 House Report) noted, "even where a suit was
brought to a successful conclusion, the scope of relief had to be
wider than what was being afforded by the courts."" Second,
challengers of the discriminatory voting practices had extreme
difficulty mounting a successful attack, no matter how blatant
the constitutional violation. "The judicial process afford[ed]
those who [were] determined to resist plentiful opportunity to
resist."" For example, in an action brought by the Department of Justice regarding voter discrimination in Dallas County, Alabama, it took nearly four years for the courts to enjoin
the open and obvious use of literacy and government-knowledge
tests." Because "litigation on a case-by-case basis simply

111. Id. reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.CA.N. 2437, 2439-42.
112. Id. See also McDonald, supra note 7, at 24. Describing the inordinate efforts
necessary to enjoin discriminatory voting practices prior to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, McDonald quotes Attorney General Katzenbach's testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee:
Existing law is inadequate. Litigation on a case-by-case basis simply
cannot do the job. Preparation of a case is extraordinarily time consuming because the relevant data-for example, the race of individuals who
have actually registered-is frequently most difficult to obtain. Many
cases have to be appealed. In almost any other field, once the basic law
is enacted by Congress and its constitutionality is upheld, those subject
to it accept it. In this field, however, the battle must be fought again
and again in county after county. And even in those jurisdictions where
judgment is finally won, local officials intent upon evading the spirit of
the law are adept at devising new discriminatory techniques not covered
by the letter of the judgment.
Id. at 24-25 (quoting Hearings on S. 1564 before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., pt. 1, at 14 (1965)).
113. H.R. REP. No. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C--N. 2437, 2440.
114. Id. reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.CAN. 2437, 2441.
115. See id. reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.CAN. 2437, 2441-42. The Department of
Justice determined that from 1954 to 1960 only 14 blacks had been permitted to
register to vote in Dallas County, of which Selma was the county seat. Moreover,
even after the court enjoined the discriminatory registration practices only 383 of
15,000 blacks in Dallas County had been registered to vote. See id. reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2441.
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[could] not do the job," Congress took the extraordinary step of
requiring certain jurisdictions in the South to preclear any
changes in voting, thereby shifting the burden to those jurisdictions to prove that the proposed
changes would not discriminate
6
color.1
or
race
of
on account
With regard to Section 5's scope and purpose, the principal
author of the legislation, Attorney General Katzenbach, testified
before the House Judiciary Subcommittee Number Five that the
purpose of the preclearance requirement was to ensure that a
state which had been found to discriminate in the past "should
be subjected to some kind of limitations as to any new legislation that it might propose."" 7 Beyond this statement and a
few others, the exact scope of Section 5 was never fully explained during the committee hearings,"' nor was its scope
illuminated during the floor debate on the Act." It has been
argued that the debate regarding Section 5's scope lends support to the conclusion that Section 5, as enacted by the Eightyninth Congress, was likely intended to cover changes relating
only to the process of registering and voting.'
The 1965 House Report on the legislation sheds little light on
the exact parameters of Section 5. In its description of the
legislation, the 1965 House Report notes that the preclearance
requirement "deals with attempts by a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions of section 4 are in
effect to alter by statute or administrative acts voting qualifications and procedures in effect on November 1, 1964.""2 While
the 1965 House Report is merely paraphrasing the statutory

116. McDonald, supra note 7, at 24-25 (quoting Hearings on S. 1564 before the
Senate comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., pt. 1, at 14 (1965) (statement of Nicholas
Katzenback, Attorney General of the United states)); see South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334-35 (holding that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
"may have been an uncommon exercise of congressional power.., but the Court has
recognized that exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise
appropriate."); see also supra note 40.
117. Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 6400 before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary., 89th Cong. 60 (1965) (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach,
Attorney General of the United States).
118. See Gluck, supra note 108, at 347-56.
119. Id. at 355.
120. Id. at 356.
121. H.R. REP. No. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2457-58
(emphasis added).
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language, of particular importance to the issue of Section 5
coverage of political parties is the Committee's emphasis on
changes made via statute or administrative regulation by a
"State or political subdivision."
The legislative history of the Voting Rights Act provides little
support for the proposition that Congress intended political
parties to be subject to the preclearance requirement of Section
5. It is beyond dispute that Congress was aware of the history
of the White Primary Cases and the repeated attempts by the
Supreme Court to halt discriminatory voting practices by political parties in those instances.' The legislative history of the
Act, however, reveals that the case-by-case method with which
Congress was concerned related to state and local officials in
the South evading adverse court decrees by implementing new
laws and practices that fell outside the parameters of those decrees.'
The legislative history does not demonstrate
Congress' belief that political parties should come within the
ambit of the preclearance requirement.
B. Congressional Extension of the Act's
Provisions-The Continued Need for Preclearance

Temporary

When the temporary provisions of the Voting Rights Act first
came before Congress for extension in 1970, Congress conducted
fourteen days of committee hearings on the continued need for
the preclearance requirement.'
Congress was fully aware of
the broad sweep which the Supreme Court had given the Act's
prohibitions in Allen v. State Board of Elections.' The House

122. See id. reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.CAN. 2437, 2439.
123. See id. reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2440-42 (noting that judicial
enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, under which the Attorney General may

institute a proceeding to "protect the right to vote from deprivation because of race or
color," results in little progress because of the extraordinary time necessary to pre-

pare a suit; and also noting that "even after apparent defeat, resisters seek new ways
and means of discriminating. Barring one contrivance too often has caused no change
in result, only in methods.").
124. See Gluck, supra note 108, at 360-68.
125. 393 U.S. 544 (1969); see H.R. REP. No. 91-397 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.CAN. 3277, 3284; Gluck, supra note 108 at 363. After reviewing the House
and Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, Gluck notes that "Allen was mentioned on
a number of occasions during the House and Senate hearings; although praise for the
decision was not unanimous, there can be little doubt that Congress was well aware

220

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:191

Judiciary Committee, in its report on the 1970 extension of the
temporary provisions of the Act (1970 House Report), 6 referred to the Allen decision with approval, noting that it "underscores the advantage section 5 produces in placing the burden of proof upon a covered jurisdiction to show that a new
voting law or procedure does not have the purpose and will not
have the effect of discriminating on the basis of color."'
The debate on the 1970 extension focused not so much on the
progress that had been made in black voter registration,"
but on the extent to which blacks nevertheless continued to lag
behind their white counterparts in voter registration in the
covered jurisdictions.'
The 1970 House Report explained that
while advances had been made, "several jurisdictions have undertaken new, unlawful ways to diminish the Negroes' franchise
and to defeat the Negro and Negro-supported candidates.""
Congressional concern regarding the shift from the obvious to
the more subtle, yet no less invidious, methods of disenfranchisement led Congress to conclude that five years of
preclearance was simply not enough. Senator Mathias aptly
demonstrated this concern in the Senate hearings on the 1970
extension, recounting the shift from the overt to the more subtle discriminatory voting practices:
The [Civil Rights Commission Study on Political Participation] indicates that the Negro vote has been diluted by
switching to at-large elections, consolidating counties, gerrymandering, and by full-slate voting requirements. It further asserts that Negro candidates are thwarted by abolishing offices, extending terms of white incumbents, substituting appointment for election, increasing filing fees, adding
of the implications of the decision." Id.
126. H.R. REP. No. 91-397, (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CA.N. 3277.
127. Id. reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 3277, 3284.
128. See Gluck, supra note 108 at 361. In the four years since the Voting Rights
Act had become law, black voter registration had increased by 800,000.
129. See Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearings on H.R. 4249, H.R. 5538, and Similar Proposals before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong. 14
(1969). The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Emanuel Celler, noted that
"[niot only does Negro registration trail white in each of the [seven 'covered' states],
but there are many individual counties and parishes where Negro registration is
especially low." See also Gluck, supra note 108, at 362 n.100 (statistics compiled by
the Voter Education Project, Voter Registration in the South).
130. H.R. REP. No. 91-397 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 3277, 3283.
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requirements for getting on the ballot, and withholding
information."l

Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that "[i]f it
had not been for Section 5 of the present Act, there is no
telling to what extent the states and communities covered
might have legislated and manipulated to continue their historical practice of excluding Negroes from the Southern political

process."

2

In contrast to those favoring the extension of Section 5, many
Southern legislators argued that the scope of the Act had been
distorted by the Supreme Court. The opposition argued that
Section 5 of the Act was intended to operate solely as a corollary to Section 4's prohibition against the use of tests and devices. Opponents of extension argued that the Supreme Court
had expanded the text of Section 5 in Allen to realms well
beyond the original intent of the Eighty-ninth Congress." 3 Opponents of extension also sounded the common refrain that
Section 5 heaped unduly burdensome administrative requirements on the covered jurisdictions. One State Attorney
General asserted that Section 5's preclearance requirement was
"tying up our entire legislative process with the Attorney General of the United States ... .
131. Gluck, supra note 108 at 362-63 (citing Amendments to the Voting Rights Act
of 1965: Hearings on S. 818, S. 2456, S. 2507 and Title IV of S. 2019 Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong. 9
(1969-70) (statement of Senator Mathias)).
132. Joint Views of Ten Members of the Judiciary Committee Relating to the Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 116 Cong. Rec. 5516, 5521 (1970). The Joint
Views concluded by expressing the continued need for preclearance in terms of the
potential for disenfranchisement in the absence of preclearance. The joint views quoted Vernon E. Jordon, Jr., the Director of the Voter Education Project of the Southern
Regional Council to highlight their point:
I know-as well as any man in this room that Canton and Grenada and
Selma and Sandersville and hundreds of other Southern communities
stand poised and ready to eliminate the burgeoning black vote in their
jurisdictions. The slightest flicker of a green light from Washington is all
these white-dominated communities need. When they receive the signal
they will act.
Id. at 5523.
133. See Gluck, supra note 108 at 364-65. Testifying before the House Judiciary
Committee Number 5, A.F. Summer, the Attorney General of Mississippi, noted that
"I[s]everal 'decisions, notably Allen v. State Board of Elections, have interpreted Section
5 in a manner which Congress could hardly have contemplated." Id. at 365 n113.
134. Id. at 364 n.109; see also Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1227
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The 1970 House Report poignantly explained what the members of the Judiciary Committee believed to be the importance
of the preclearance requirement in the overall statutory scheme
of enforcing the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment:
The committee is convinced that section 5's procedures are
an integral part of the rights afforded by the 1965 Act.
Federal review of voting law changes insures that, with
discrimination in registration and at the voting booth
blocked, the affected States and counties cannot, by employing changes in legislation undo or defeat the rights recently
won by nonwhite voters. 5
Despite the objections to Section 5 and several attempts to
defeat its extension, it was ultimately extended by Congress in
1970. This result incorporated the intervening Supreme Court
decisions interpreting Section 5.1"'
Just five years later, when Congress was again faced with
the issue of extending the temporary provisions of the Voting
Rights Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report (1975 Senate Report) stated the principal objectives of the legislation: "(1)
to extend for an additional ten years the special provisions of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965; (2) to make permanent the 1970
temporary ban on literacy tests and other devices; and (3) to
expand the coverage of the Act to certain jurisdictions in which
language minorities reside.""7 The Committee again recognized the advances that had been made in black voter registra-

(1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the decision of the Court to include political parties within the ambit of Section 5's preclearance requirement "will increase
exponentially the number of preclearance requests, for even the most innocuous
changes, that the Attorney General must process within a statutorily limited amount
of time ....
That the inclusion of political parties under § 5 demeans the
preclearance regime and so drastically increases its scope substantially undermines
the possibility that Congress intended parties to preclear.").
135. H.R. REP. No. 91-397 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3277, 3284.
136. See 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.09 (5th ed. 1992) (stating the cannon of construction that when a legislature reenacts a statute which has been interpreted by a court, the legislature "impliedly adopts the interpretation upon reenactment.").
137. S. REP. No. 94-295, at 8 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.CA.N. 774, 774.
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tion,u but noted that preclearance nevertheless remained a
viable and necessary enforcement tool.139
In 1975, Congress found that the "foresight and wisdom of
the Eighty-ninth Congress in anticipating the need for future
Federal review of voting changes in covered jurisdictions" had
yet to fulfill its mission.' The Senate Judiciary Committee
noted that recent objections interposed by the Attorney General
with respect to Section 5 submissions "clearly bespeak the continuing need for this preclearance mechanism.""'
Congress again considered the continued need for Section 5's

138. See id. at 13, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 779. The Senate Judiciary
Committee noted that
[riegistration rates for blacks in the covered southern jurisdictions has
continued to increase since the passage of the Act. For example, while
only 6.7 percent of the black voting age population of Mississippi was
registered before 1965, 63.2 percent of such persons were registered in
1971-72. Similar dramatic increases in black registration can be observed
in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Virginia.
Id.
139. See id. reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C-4AN. 774, 781. See generally U.S. COMINSSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER (1975) (discussing
the Commission on Civil Rights' findings regarding, among other things, the implementation of the Voting Rights Act, the effect of the Act since its adoption, and the
various barriers to suffrage existing throughout the country, including barriers to
voting, registration, candidacy, fair representation in local governments, and representation in Congress and state legislatures).
140. Id. reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 781.
141. Id. at 16, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.CAN. 774, 782. The number of changes
submitted to the Department of Justice by the covered jurisdictions, the objections
interposed by the Attorney General to those submissions, and the types of voting
changes submitted by the covered jurisdictions, revealed what the members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee considered to be potent evidence supporting another
extension of Section 5. The pattern of Georgia is demonstrative of the evidence the
Judiciary Committee considered. See id. reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.CAN. 774, 782. In
1967, Georgia made no submissions to the Attorney General under Section 5. By
1972, that number had risen to 226. In 1974, the year before the 1975 extension
legislation, Georgia submitted 173 changes to the Attorney General. Similarly in 1967,
the Attorney General, with not a single submission by Georgia, obviously made no
objections. See id. at 17, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.CAN. 774, 783. By 1972, the Attorney General interposed eleven objections to voting changes submitted by Georgia
officials. In 1974, the Attorney General objected to nine of the changes proposed by
Georgia. During the period of 1965 to 1974, the types of changes submitted to the
Attorney General for preclearance covered a broad spectrum. See id. reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.CAN. 774, 783. The covered jurisdictions submitted 443 redistricting proposals;
1,025 annexation plans; 631 changes with respect to polling places; 80 changes regarding voter registration; and 1,549 ordinances or other legislation affecting election
laws.
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preclearance requirement in 1982. Upon signing the legislation
which extended the provision an additional twenty-five years,
President Reagan noted that "the right to vote is the crown
jewel of American liberties, and we will not see its luster diminished."'
When Congress re-examined the need for
preclearance in 1982, many of the traditional justifications for
extension of the special provisions of the Act remained.
With respect to the continued need for the preclearance requirement, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 (1982 Senate Report) explained:
[e]ach time that Congress has continued the special coverage of the Voting Rights Act the argument was made that
Section 5 was no longer needed. Congress has had to balance a record of some progress against strong evidence of
continuing discrimination. And each time Congress has
decided to retain Section 5.14
Accordingly, the Senate Judiciary Committee found that extension of Section 5 was again warranted.
The testimony taken by the Senate Judiciary Committee
during consideration of the 1982 extension reflected the numerous types of changes in voting that Section 5 continued to monitor. Among the most common changes were the use of at-large
elections, redistricting, and majority vote requirements. In light
of these perceived threats to minority voting, the Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that "since the adoption of the Voting Rights Act, covered jurisdictions have substantially moved
from direct over[t] impediments to the right to vote to more
sophisticated devices that dilute minority voting strength."1'

142. Remarks on Signing H.R. 3112 into Law, 18 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 846,
847 (June 29, 1982).
143. S. REP. No. 97-417, 7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 184; see
also supra notes 117, 127 (describing increases in black voter registration).
144. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. 177, 187. The Committee Report
gave a terse description of what it perceived to be the motivation behind many of the
more sophisticated changes in voting practices in the covered jurisdictions:
Many of the practices to which objections have been entered are complex
and subtle. Sophisticated rules regarding elections may seem part of the
everyday rough-and-tumble of American politics-tactics used traditionally
by the "ins" against the "outs." Viewed in this context, however, the
schemes reported here are clearly the latest in a direct line of repeated
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In addition to the continued need for preclearance based on
discriminatory voting practices in the covered jurisdictions, the
Committee found extension of Section 5 warranted by substantial non-compliance with the preclearance requirement.' The
Committee found that "there has been continued widespread
failure to submit proposed changes in election law for Section 5
review before attempting to implement the change."'
Taken as a whole, the legislative history of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 and its several extensions clearly indicate Congress'
belief that those jurisdictions meeting the coverage requirements of Section 4(b) should carry the burden of demonstrating
that any change in a voting practice or procedure would not
have a discriminatory effect before they could implement such a
change. The legislative history of the Voting Rights Act extensions reveals the congressional belief that while great strides
had been made since the days of southern stonewalling in the
face of adverse court decrees, preclearance remained a viable
enforcement tool. The legislative history does not suggest that
the relatively direct command of Section 5-that a covered
"State or political subdivision" must preclear proposed changes
in voting-somehow includes non-governmental entities such as
political parties.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT -A
BROAD INTERPRETATION

A. The Supreme Court Furthers the Goals of the Voting
Rights Act
Congress, fully aware of the ingenuity of those wishing to
perpetuate the disenfranchisement of blacks and of the ineffectiveness of the case-by-case method of enforcing the Fifteenth
Amendment's guarantees, passed the Voting Rights Act in an

efforts to perpetuate the results of past voting discrimination and to
undermine the gains won under other sections of the Voting Rights Act.
Id. at 12, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. 177, 189; see Strauss, supra note 72, at 410
(statement of Charles L. Black, Jr., noting the shift from the overt to the more subtle
disenfranchising voting changes proposed by covered jurisdictions).
145. Id. reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C-AN. 177, 189.
146. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 12 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. 177, 189.

226

UNVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:191

attempt to shift "the advantages of time and inertia from the

perpetrators of the evil to its victims."'47 In upholding the
constitutionality of various provisions of the Act, the Supreme
Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach'1

endorsed Congress'

foresight in trying to prevent discriminatory practices in voting
through Section 5's preclearance requirement.'4 9

1. Types of Voting Changes Covered by Section 5
In decisions following Katzenbach, the Supreme Court rejected challenges to the Voting Rights Act that sought to have the
terms of Section 5 preclearance applied narrowly to only the act
of casting a ballot. In Allen v. State Board of Elections," the
Supreme Court held that Congress "intended to reach any state
enactment which altered
the election law of a covered State in
5
even a minor way."' '

147. United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 121 (1978).
148. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
149. In ruling on the constitutionality of Section 5, the Supreme Court held that:
The Act suspends new voting regulations pending scrutiny by federal
authorities to determine whether their use would violate the Fifteenth
Amendment. This may have been an uncommon exercise of congressional
power, as South Carolina contends, but the Court has recognized that
exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate. Congress knew that some of the States covered by [Section]
4(b) of the Act had resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving
new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting
discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees. Congress had
reason to suppose that these states might try similar maneuvers in the
future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained
in the Act itself. Under the compulsion of these unique circumstances,
Congress responded in a permissibly decisive manner.
Id. at 334-35 (citation omitted).
150. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
151. Id. at 566. The Court "rejected a narrow construction" of Section 5, noting
that the
Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state
regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote
because of their race. Moreover, compatible with the decisions of this
Court, the Act gives a broad interpretation of the right to vote, recognizing that voting includes "all action necessary to make a vote effective."
Id. at 565-66 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)); see also BERNARD
GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY

30 (1992) (noting that "[t]he significance of Section 5 did not become evident until the
decision in Allen v. State Board of Elections, in which the Supreme Court applied
this section to changes that diluted black citizen's votes as well as to devices that
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In Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 2 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the principle that "all changes in voting must
be precleared,"'
while more precisely defining what constitutes a change in voting. In Presley, the Court, noting the history of its Section 5 decisions," stated that Allen's holding that

disenfranchised blacks").
The Allen Court also recalled the testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach
before the House Judiciary Committee regarding the appropriateness of the extraordinary remedies found in Section 5:
The justification for [the approval requirements] is simply this: Our experience in the areas that would be covered by this bill has been such as
to indicate frequently on the part of the State legislatures a desire, in a
sense, to out guess the courts of the United States or even to out guess
the Congress of the United States ....

Allen, 393 U.S. at 567.
152. 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
153. Id. at 501.
154. Faced with the issue of whether changes made by two local County Commissions reducing the decision making authority of certain elected officials constituted
changes in voting so as to be subject to Section 5 preclearance, the Presley Court
adopted a categorical approach to determining whether a particular change by a covered jurisdiction is one that pertains to "voting-."
The principle that [Section] 5 covers voting changes over a wide range is
well illustrated by the separate cases we considered in the single opinion
for the Court in Allen ....
Our cases since Allen reveal a consistent requirement that changes
subject to [Section] 5 pertain only to voting. Without implying that the
four typologies exhaust the statute's coverage, we can say these later
cases fall within one of the four factual contexts presented in the Allen
cases. First, we have held that [Section] 5 applies to cases like Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections itself, in which the changes involved the manner of
voting. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 387 (1971) (location of
polling places). Second, we have held that [Section] 5 applies to cases
like Whitley v. Williams [an Allen companion case], which involve candidacy requirements and qualifications. See NAACP v. Hampton County
Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166 (1985) (change in filing deadline); Hadnott
v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969) (same); Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v.
White, 439 U.S. 32 (1978) (rule requiring board of education members to
take unpaid leave of absence while campaigning for office). Third, we
have applied [Section] 5 to cases like Fairley v. Patterson [an Allen companion case], which concerned changes in the composition of the electorate that may vote for candidates for a given office. See Perkins v.
Matthews, 400 U.S. at 394 (change from ward to at-large elections); id.
at 388 (boundary lines of voting districts); City of Richmond v. United
States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (same). Fourth, we have made clear that
[Section] 5 applies to changes, like the one in Bunton v. Patterson (an
Allen companion case], affecting the creation or abolition of an elective
office. See McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236 (1984) (appointed officials
replaced by elected officials); Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125
(1983) (increase in the number of city councilors).
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"the scope of Section 5 is expansive within its sphere of operation " "r is nevertheless limited by the terms of Section 5.156
"That sphere comprehends all changes to rules governing voting, changes effected through any of the mechanisms described
in the statute. Those mechanisms are any 'qualification or
prerequisite' or ' any
'standard, practice, or procedure with re' 57
spect to voting."
With that broad sphere in mind, the Court held in Presley
that "[o]ur cases since Allen reveal a consistent requirement
that changes subject to [Section] 5 pertain only to voting," "
and that "[c]hanges which affect only the distribution of power
among officials are not subject to [Section] 5 because such
changes have no direct relation to, or impact on, voting."'5 9
The Presley Court categorized the types of changes that "pertain" to voting according to four factual contexts: (1) changes
affecting the manner of voting; (2) changes affecting the requirements and qualifications for candidacy; (3) changes affecting the composition of the electorate; and (4) changes creating
or abolishing an elective office."ce

The first three categories involve changes in election procedures,
while all the examples in the fourth category might be termed substantive changes as to which offices are elective. But whether the changes are of procedure or substance, each has a direct relation to voting and
the election process.
Presley, 502 U.S. at 502-03.
155. Id. at 501.
156. See Carol A. Evans, Recent Developments, Limitations of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965: Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992), 15 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 1031 (1992). Evans argued that Presley represents a retreat from
the command of Allen that Section 5 be given the broadest possible interpretation in
keeping with the intent of Congress: "Although the majority claims to adhere to
Allen's broad interpretation of the Act, Presley marks a retreat from the Court's prior
commitment to guard against vote dilution and is incompatible with the intent of
Section 5." Id. at 1037.
157. Presley, 502 U.S. at 501-02 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 502.
159. Id. at 506; see Mary Massaron Ross, The Voting Rights Act: Interpretation of
the Statutory Text, the Political Subtext, and the Constitutional Overlay, 26 URB. LAW.
723, 724 (1994) (noting that the recent Supreme Court decisions of Holder v. Hall,
114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994), and Johnson v. DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994), represent
a continuation of the "Court's recent trend toward cutting back on its most expansive
reading of the Voting Rights Act and emphasizing the necessity of workable judicial
standards that avoid excessive intrusions of the federal courts into the decision-making sphere of state and local governments.").
160. See Presley, 502 U.S. at 502-03.
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2. Types of Entities Within Covered Jurisdictions Subject to
Preclearance
As the Supreme Court has given a broad reading to Section 5
with respect to the types of changes in election laws and practices that must be precleared, it has also given a liberal reading to Section 5 regarding the types of governmental entities
within a covered jurisdiction subject to Section 5's requirements. 161 In United States v. Board of Commissioners,16 1 the
Court held that while a narrow reading of Section 14 of the Act
would not bring the City of Sheffield-which was neither a
county nor a parish and had never conducted registration for
voting'---within the coverage of Section 5, "the language of
the Act does not require such a crippling interpretation, but
rather is susceptible of a reading that will fully implement the
congressional objectives.""s In keeping with its penchant for
liberally construing the provisions of the Voting Rights Act, the
Court held that
[t]he language, structure, history, and purposes of the Act
persuade us that [Section] 5, like the constitutional provisions it is designed to implement, applies to all entities
having power over any aspect of the electoral process within
designated jurisdictions, not only to counties or to whatever
units of state government perform the function of registering voters."6
To hold otherwise, the Court noted, would be to permit "pre-

161. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994) (providing that preclearance applies to a state or
political subdivision that meets the requirements of Section 1973b(a) and (b)); 42
U.S.C. § 19731(c)(2) (1994) (defining "political subdivision" as "any county or parish,
except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a
county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a state which conducts registration for voting."); see also 25 AM. JUR. 2D Elections § 114 (1996) (stating
that political parties and their officials are not covered by Section 5).
162. 435 U.S. 110 (1978).
163. Id. at 117.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 118; see also Dougherty County, Georgia, Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439
U.S. 32 (1978) (applying Sheffield in holding that a county school board, as a governmental entity, is subject to Section 5).
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cisely the kind of circumvention of congressional policy that
[Section] 5 was designed to prevent."'6 6
In Sheffield, the Court employed both a textual and an intent
based approach in determining that Section 5 applies
territorially to governmental entities within a covered jurisdic.tion. The Court's textual analysis concluded that
Section 5 provides that it is to apply to the jurisdictions
"with respect to which" [Section] 4(a)'s prohibitions are in
effect. Since the States or political subdivisions "with respect to which" [Section] 4(a)'s duties apply are entire territories and not just county governments or the units of local
government that register voters, [Section] 5 must, it would
seem, apply territorially as well.16
Relying on the House and Senate committee reports from the
1975 extension of Section 5, the Sheffield Court found that the
legislative history of the 1975 extension "preclude[s] the conclusion that [Section] 5 was not understood to operate
territorially." 8' The Sheffield Court also highlighted the fact
that during the floor debate on the extension of Section 5, none
of the opponents of the measure took exception with the statement that "[a]ny [voting changes] . . . made in precincts, county
districts, school districts, municipalities, or State legislatures, or
any other kind of officers, ha[ve] to be submitted ... to the
Attorney General."'69 As such, the Court found that it was
bound by the implications of Congress' re-enactment of Section
5: "When a Congress that re-enacts a statute voices its approval
of an administrative or other interpretation thereof, Congress is
treated as having adopted that interpretation, and this court is
bound thereby." 70

166. Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 117.
167. Id. at 126.
168. Id. at 134 (citing S. REP. No. 94-295, 12 (1975); H. R. REP. No. 94-196, at 5
(1975)).
169. Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 134 (citing 121 CoNG. REC. S13,331 (July 22, 1975)
(remarks of Sen. Allen)).
170. Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 134; see SINGER, supra note 136, § 49.09 ("Where reenactment of a statute includes a contemporaneous and practical interpretation, the
practical interpretation is accorded greater weight than it ordinarily receives, as it is
regarded as presumptively the correct interpretation of the law." When a legislature
reenacts a statute which has been interpreted by a court, the legislature "impliedly
adopts the interpretation upon reenactment.").
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B. Judicial Pronouncements Regarding the Applicability of
Preclearanceto Political PartiesPriorto Morse
Prior to Morse,17 1 the Supreme Court had yet to address the
specific question of the applicability of Section 5's preclearance
requirement to non-governmental entities. While the language
of Sheffield spoke in broad terms, holding that Section 5 applied to "all entities having power over any aspect of the electoral process within designated jurisdictions,"'
the factual
context of Sheffield's holding was nevertheless limited to governmental entities. 73 The issue of political party coverage under Section 5, however, was not an entirely new one. Under
regulations promulgated by the Justice Department, certain
activities of political parties were considered to be subject to
the preclearance requirement.'74 Several lower courts had held
that political parties could be subject to preclearance in a variety of factual contexts. The question presented in Morse was
ripe for consideration given the lower courts' holdings regarding
171. See infra Part V.
172. Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 118.
173. See Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1226 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas rejected the "all entities having power over any aspect of
the electoral process" language of Sheffield used by Justice Stevens to justify applying
Section 5 to non-governmental entities. Justice Thomas noted that the holding of
Sheffield was limited by the factual setting in which the case was decided. He further concluded that, "Sheffield ... stands, at most, for the proposition that a local
unit of government, like a city, may be considered the 'State' for purposes of [Section]
5 ....
There is no basis in Sheffield and its progeny for covering nongovernmental
entities under [Section] 5." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
174. 28 C.F.R. § 51.7 (1996). The Attorney General's regulation provides that under
certain circumstances political parties in covered jurisdictions must preclear.
Certain activities of political parties are subject to the preclearance requirement of section 5. A change affecting voting effected by a political
party is subject to the preclearance requirement: (a) if the change relates
to a public electoral function of the party and (b) if the party is acting
under authority explicitly or implicitly granted by a covered jurisdiction
or political subunit subject to the preclearance requirement of Section 5.
For example, changes with respect to the recruitment of party members,
the conduct of political campaigns, and the drafting of political platforms
are not subject to the preclearance requirement. Changes with respect to
the conduct of primary elections at which party nominees, delegates to
party conventions, or party officials are chosen are subject to the
preclearance requirement of Section 5. Where appropriate the term 'jurisdiction" (but not "covered jurisdiction") includes political parties.
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political party coverage under Section 5, the Attorney General's

inclusion of political parties within the scope of Section 5, and
the Supreme Court's decision in Sheffield.

5

In MacGuire v. Amos,"7 the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama held that rules promulgated
by the State's Republican and Democratic parties governing the
election of delegates to the parties' national conventions were
subject to the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights
Act. 177 The court first determined that political parties could
be subject to the mandates of Section 5 even though they were
neither a "State" nor a "political subdivision" as those terms are
usually understood.'75 Under Alabama's election laws, the political parties were permitted to conduct primary nominating
elections to determine their candidates for office.' 79 The political parties were also authorized by statute to select their delegates to national conventions."o The MacGuire court determined that these statutory grants of power over the electoral
process made the political parties potentially subject to Section
5:
Clearly the State cannot avoid the strictures of the Act by
empowering some body other than its legislature to regulate
those electoral processes. Where the political parties are
given such head by a specific statutory grant of authority,
their actions rise to the level of actions by the State. 1

175. Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 118; see supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
176. 343 F. Supp. 119 (M.D. Ala. 1972); see also Kirke M. Hassan, Comment,
MacGuire v. Amos: Application of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to PoliticalParties, 8 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 199 (1973). After reviewing the decision of the
MacGuire Court, Hassan argues that if, as the "constitutional cases" regarding political parties and voting rights recognize, "party action may be predominantly governmental in nature, equivalent to that of a state in its effect on the right to vote, the
private nature of party action in other contexts does not require that Section 5 be
read to exclude parties per se." Id. at 210.
177. See MacGuire, 343 F. Supp. at 121.
178. See id.
179. See id.

180. See id.
181. Id. See also Arthur M. Weisburd, Candidate-Making and the Constitution:
ConstitutionalRestraints on and Protections of Party Nominating Methods, 57 S. CAL
L. REV. 213, 223-32 (1984) (discussing the state action doctrine in the context of
political party activity).

1997]

MORSE V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VIRGINIA2

233

Having determined that the scope of Section 5 included political parties acting under specific statutory authority, the
MacGuire court then concluded that the particular party rules
at issue-the drawing of voting districts within the state from
which members of the party could run for a seat at the party's
national convention-were "unarguably" changes with respect to
voting "within the coverage of Section 5."2

In another decision holding political party activity subject to
the requirements of Section 5 preclearance, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York concluded
that party rule changes expanding the voting power of the
party's executive committee "were changes requiring
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act ....

."'

In Fortune,

the executive committee of the county Democratic Party expanded the authority to vote on committee business from those
members who were elected (mostly black) to include those members who were also appointed (mostly white). The plaintiffs
challenged the action as one requiring preclearance. The court,
applying both the statutory language and the Justice
Department's regulation implementing Section 5,' concluded
that the Party's actions were subject to preclearance."
In Hawthorne v. Baker,' the Democratic Party of Alabama
and many of its county committees sought to change the method by which the members of the various party executive committees were selected. The Justice Department had previously
declined a preclearance request from the state party. While
another request was pending, the state party and its county
counterparts began implementation of the rule change.' The
court held that, under MacGuire, it was settled law that political parties can be subject to Section 5." Having so determined, the Hawthorne court heeded the Supreme Court's broad

182. MacGuire, 343 F. Supp. at 121.
183. Fortune v. Kings County Democratic County Comm-, 598 F. Supp. 761, 765

(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
184. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.7 (1996); supra note 174.
185. See Fortune, 598 F. Supp. at 764-65.
186. 750 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ala. 1990).

187. See id. at 1092-93.
188. See id. at 1094-95.
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interpretation of Section 5, holding the change at issue to be
one with respect to voting.189
V. THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL
PARTY COVERAGE UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT IN MORSE

A. Background to Morse
In Morse v. Republican Party,90 the Supreme Court determined that the Republican Party of Virginia's (Party) requirement that delegates to the state nominating convention pay a
filing fee constituted a change in a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting." As such, the Court held that the Party and
its filing fee were subject to the preclearance. requirement of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.' 9 '
In 1994, three law students attending the University of Virginia sought to participate in a convention at which Virginia
Republicans were to select their candidate for the upcoming
United States Senate race. The two candidates vying for the
Republican nomination were Colonel Oliver North and James
Miller, former Director of the Office of Management and Budget
for the Reagan Administration.'92 The party informed the students that they were required to pay a filing fee to become
delegates to the convention and to cast their vote for a candidate. Appellants filed a complaint alleging that the filing fee
requirement violated Sections 5 and 10 of the Voting Rights
Act, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

189. See id. at 1095. The court noted that "Supreme Court cases teach ... that
Congress intended the Act to reach any enactment which altered election procedures
'in even a minor way' and that the phrase 'standard, practice, or procedure' must be
given the 'broadest possible scope.- Id. (citations omitted).
190. 116 S.Ct. 1186 (1996).
191. Id. at 1192; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994); see also Loren Singer, Fee Charged
to Convention Delegates Required Preclearance,Supreme Court Decides, WEST'S LEGAL
NEWS, Mar. 28, 1996 available in 1996 WL 259410.
192. Colonel North prevailed at the Republican Convention, only to lose in the
general election to the incumbent Senator Charles Robb.

1997]

MORSE V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VIRGINIA

235

Amendment and the prohibition against poll taxes of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment."
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, gave the opinion
of the Court. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and
O'Connor, concurred in the judgment. Justices Scalia, Thomas,
Kennedy, and Rehnquist dissented. The Court ruled that Section 5 encompassed the Party's voting qualifications and procedures (in the form of the delegate filing fee) when its nominees
are chosen at a convention. Justice Stevens explained why the
district court's ruling was in error, and that coverage of the
filing fee was mandated by the Court's consistent interpretation
of Section 5.'9
The district court, in granting the Party's motion to dismiss
the Section 5 claims, reasoned that the Party's delegate filing

193. See Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1191-92; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (§ 5) (1994); 42
U.S.C. § 1973h 2 (§ 10) (1994). In Section 10(a), Congress declared that "the constitutional right of citizens to vote is denied or abridged in some areas by the requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting." As such, Section 10(b)
authorizes the Attorney General to institute "such actions, including actions against
States or political subdivisions, for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief against
the enforcement of any requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a precondition to
voting ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also supra note 41. U.S. CONST. amend.
XXIV provides that: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or
Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax
or other tax. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation."
Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, a three-judge panel of the District
Court of the Western District of Virginia took jurisdiction. The district court remanded the constitutional claims to a single-judge district court. The district court panel
also remanded a separate statutory claim alleging that a loan made by the North
campaign to appellant Morse covering the delegate filing fee violated Section 11(c) of
the Voting Rights Act to a single-judge district court. With respect to the Section 5
and Section 10 claims, the district court panel granted the Party's motion to dismiss.
See Morse v. Oliver North for U.S. Senate Comm., Inc., 853 F. Supp. 212 (W.D. Va.
1994). Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides that an appeal of the district
court's ruling lies in the Supreme Court. As such, the Supreme Court noted probable
jurisdiction, and in Morse reversed the district court's dismissal of appellant's Voting
Rights claims in a five to four decision. See Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1210. With respect
to appellants' Section 10 claim, the Court held that a private right of action was
implied under Section 10, even though it only authorizes the Attorney General to
bring enforcement actions regarding poll taxes. See id..at 1211-13. Neither the constitutional claims under the Fourteenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments nor the Section
11(c) claim were before the Supreme Court in Morse.
194. See Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1193.
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fee for participation in a state convention was not subject to
preclearance because: (1) a regulation by the Attorney General
implementing Section 5 did not apply to Party activities outside
of the primary process, and (2) the Supreme Court's affi-mance
of Williams v. Democratic Party95 indicated that a political
party's decision to "change its method of selecting delegates to a
national convention" does not trigger Section 5 coverage. 9 '
Justice Stevens rejected both bases for ruling that the Party's
delegate filing fee did not require preclearance.
B. The Opinion of the Court
1. The Attorney General's
51.7-Requires Preclearance

Regulation-28

C.F.R.

§

Under 28 C.F.R. § 51.7,' changes affecting voting made by
political parties within a covered jurisdiction are subject to
Section 5's preclearance requirement if "the change relates to a
public electoral function of the party" and "if the party is acting
under authority explicitly or implicitly granted by a covered
jurisdiction or political subunit."95 Justice Stevens found that
the Republican Party of Virginia satisfied both of the
regulation's requirements for political party coverage."

195. Civ. Action No. 16286 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 1972), affd, 409 U.S. 809 (1972).
196. See Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1192; Morse v. Oliver North for U.S. Senate Comm.,
Inc., 853 F. Supp. 212, 216 (W.D. Va. 1994).
197. 28 C.F.R. § 51.7 (1996). See also supra note 18 for those jurisdictions currently subject to the preclearance requirement of Section 5; 28 C.F.R. § 51.23 (1996)
(providing that preclearance submissions are to be made "by the chief legal officer or
other appropriate official of the submitting authority."). 28 C.F.R. § 51.23(b) provides
that changes affecting voting made by a political party "may be submitted by an
appropriate official of the political party." Id Prior to the inclusion of the language
regarding political party submissions in 28 C.F.R. § 51.23(b), there was no administrative authority on how a political party meeting the requirements of 28 C.F.R. §
51.7 should submit proposed changes in voting. See Williams v. Democratic Party,
Civ. Action No. 16286 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 1972) (holding that a political party did not
have to preclear changes in voting because there was no administrative process for
submission of such changes).
198. 28 C.F.R. § 51.7 (1996).
199. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1193. The Party did not dispute the fact that the delegate filing fee was a change in voting from that in effect on November 1, 1964. Nor
did the Party dispute the fact that the filing fee relates to "a public electoral function
of the party." Id. The Party claimed, however, that it was not acting under delegated
State authority when it charged the filing fee. See id.
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Under Virginia law,"' the nominees of the two major political parties automatically appear on the general election ballot
"without the need to declare their candidacy or to demonstrate
their support with a nominating petition." 0 ' Justice Stevens
reasoned that because the Commonwealth of Virginia has the
sole authority to establish the qualifications for ballot access,
and has delegated a portion of that authority to the two major
political parties in the form of automatic ballot access for nominated candidates, "the parties ac[t] under the authority of Virginia when they decide who will appear on the general election
ballot."20 2
Justice Stevens found support for applying the regulation to
the Party in Smith v. Allwright.2° In Smith, one of the White
Primary Cases, the Court found action by the Democratic Party
of Texas violative of the Fifteenth Amendment when it held
that "state delegation to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function
that may make the party's action the action of the State."2°
The Court in Morse noted that it is not the extent of the state
regulation over a political party's activities that determines
whether there has been a delegation of state authority.0 5
Rather, where the nominating procedure over which the State
has delegated authority to a political party is "an integral part
of the election machinery,"2° the party functions as a state
actor and can therefore be subject to Section 5 preclearance re-

quirements.07 Consequently, "[b]y the logic of Smith ... the

200. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-511 (Michie 1993) (providing that the Secretary of

a political party is to certify the party's nominee, chosen at either a convention or a
primary, to the State Board of Elections).
201. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1194; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-506 (Michie 1993)
(requiring independent candidates for office to file both a statement of candidacy and
a petition with a specified number of signatures from registered voters with the State
Board of Elections in order to qualify for placement on the general election ballot).
202. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1194-95.
203. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). For a full discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court cases
addressing state action and political activities, see Arthur M. Weisburd, CandidateMaking and the Constitution: Constitutional Restraints on and Protections of Party
Nominating Methods, 57 S.CAL. L. REV. 213, 214-19 (1984).
204. Smith, 321 U.S. at 660.
205. Morse, 116 S.Ct. at 1196, n.17.
206. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1940).
207. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1196-97. Justice Stevens considered the "only difference"
between the factual setting of Smith and Morse to be one of degree. See id. In
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Party acted under the authority of the Commonwealth," thereby
satisfying the second requirement of the Attorney General's
regulation."'
Justice Stevens conceded that the terms of 28 C.F.R. § 51.7
speak only of primary elections,2" but he nevertheless deferred to the Department of Justice's interpretation of its regulation providing that the regulation applies "to changes affecting voting at a party convention.""10 Accordingly, Justice
Stevens determined that "regulation required preclearance of
the Party's delegate filing fee."21 '
2. The Language, Structure, and History of Section 5 Require
Preclearance of the Party's Delegate Filing Fee
Justice Stevens concluded that Section 5, by its own force
and independent of the Attorney General's regulation, encompassed "changes in electoral practices such as the Party's impo-

Smith, the party was required by law to select its candidates at a primary election,
while under Virginia law political parties are not required to choose their candidate
via a primary election. Rather, under Virginia law, the parties may choose between
the primary election and the nominating convention. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-509
(Michie 1993). For Justice Stevens, this choice "makes the delegation of authority...
more expansive, not less, for the Party is granted even greater power over the selection of its nominees." Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1196-97.
208. Id. at 1196; see 28 C.F.R. § 51.7 (1996) providing that
A change affecting voting effected by a political party is subject to the
preclearance requirement: (a) If the change relates to a public electoral
function of the party and (b) if the party is acting under authority explicitly or implicitly granted by a covered jurisdiction or political subunit
subject to the preclearance requirement of section 5.
209. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.7 (1996) (providing that "[cihanges with respect to the
conduct of primary elections at which party nominees, delegates to party conventions,
or party officials are chosen are subject to the preclearance requirement of section 5."
(emphasis added)). While the regulation speaks of "delegates to party conventions," it
does so in the context of the conduct of primary elections, not the nominating convention itself. See id.
210. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1196-97. Justice Stevens stated that '[w]e are satisfied
that the Department's interpretation of its own regulation is correct." Id The court
cited a letter from the Solicitor General to the Clerk of the Supreme Court noting
that "[s]ince 1981, when the regulation was promulgated, there have been nearly
2,000 preclearance submissions involving more than 16,000 proposed changes by political parties in covered jurisdictions." Id. at 1196 n.18.
211. Id. at 1197. The conclusion reached by Justice Stevens that the Party was
subject to Section 5 preclearance under the Attorney General's regulation did not
receive support from the remaining seven members of the Court.
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of a filing fee for delegates to its convention."' The
in Morse noted that the terms of Section 5 and the defiof "vote" or "voting" in Section 14,213 together with the
reading which the Court has consistently given Section

5,14 warranted finding the Party's delegate filing fee within

the ambit of Section 5.2" Justice Stevens noted that the
Party's filing fee "operates precisely in the same fashion"216 as
other changes in voting laws and practices which the Court had
previously found to be subject to preclearance.217
Justice Stevens appeared to be less concerned with the label
that might be attached to the electoral procedure which the
changed practice or procedure would affect, than with whether
the change "weakens the 'effectiveness' of [the] vote cast in the
general election itself."18 Similarly, Justice Stevens argued
that as long as a change has an effect on the general election,
the Court has never hesitated to find the change within Section
5's coverage, notwithstanding the fact that the changed process
was something other than a primary.'

212. Id. at 1198.
213. See 42 U.S.C. 19731(c)(1) (1994).
The terms "vote" or "voting" shall include all action necessary to make a
vote effective in any primary, special, or general election, including, but
not limited to, registration, listing pursuant to this subchapter, or other
action required by law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and having
such ballot counted properly and included in the appropriate totals of
votes cast with respect to candidates for public or party office and propositions for which votes are received in an election.
Id. (emphasis added).
214. See supra Part IVA.
215. See Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1198-1200.
216. Id. at 1199.
217. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1992).
218. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1199.
219. See id The Morse Court discussed two types of changes affecting nominating
processes, other than primaries, which have been subject to Section 5 preclearance. In
Whitley v. Williams, 393 U.S. 544 (1965), a companion case to Allen, the Court held
that certain procedures for nominating independent candidates were subject to
preclearance when a jurisdiction covered under Section 4(b) of the Act sought to implement them. In Morse Justice Stevens interpreted the Allen Court as being "unconcerned that the changes did not directly relate to the conduct of a primary, because
they had an effect on the general election." Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1199. Additionally,
Justice Stevens noted that the Court has consistently held that changes potentially
resulting in vote dilution are subject to Section 5 coverage. See id. at 1199-1200. In
this regard, the Morse Court weakens the distinction between the nominating process
and the general election in the context of vote dilution:
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Interpreting the provisions of the Voting Rights Act in conjunction with one another, the Court found additional support
for its conclusion that the delegate filing fee came within the
provisions of Section 5. Section 14?s220 reference to "party office" led Justice Stevens to conclude that the filing fee appropriately fell within Section 5's coverage. 221 The Court stated that
Section 2 of the Act, which prohibits discriminatory voting qualifications or prerequisites nation-wide, must be read in conjunction with Section 5. 2 ' A violation of Section 2 is found to exist when "it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are
not equally open to participation" to persons on the basis of
their race. 2'

The Morse Court reasoned that a new voting

practice sought to be implemented in a covered jurisdiction that
would be a violation of Section 2, must also be considered as a
change that falls within the preclearance requirements of
Section 5.

"Exclusion from the earlier stage . . . does not merely curtail .

. . voting
power, but abridges [the] right to vote itself. To the excluded voter who
cannot cast a vote for his or her candidate, it is all the same whether
the party conducts its nomination by a primary or by a convention open
to all members except those kept out by the filing fee.
Id. at 1200; see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. In Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536, the first of the White Primary Cases, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court,
made a similar argument, focusing on the practical realities of the discriminatory
practices. In Herndon, the Court was unconcerned with the superficial distinction
between the general and the primary election: "If the defendant's conduct was wrong
to the plaintiff the same reasons that allow recovery for denying the plaintiff a vote
at a final election allow it for denying a vote at the primary election that may determine the final result." Id. at 538.
220. See supra note 213.
221. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1200. A delegate to a convention is also included in
Section 14's reference to "party office."
222. See id. at 1200-01 (noting that if Section 5 was not as broad as Section 2,
"then a covered jurisdiction would not need to preclear changes in voting practices
known to be illegal.").
223. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
224. See generally Haddad, supra note 22. Haddad explains that Congress amended
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to overrule the Supreme Court's decision
in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which held that to establish a claim
under Section 2, a plaintiff had to prove discriminatory intent on the part of the
government. Section 2, as amended, provides that "[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) [applying to
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The opinion of the Court in Morse also relied on the history
surrounding the adoption of the Voting Rights Act as further
support that the Party's delegate filing fee is covered by Section
5,

The purpose of the Voting Rights Act was to implement

the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment."2 The Court notlanguage minorities in certain jurisdictions]." 42 U.S.C. 1973 (1994) (emphasis added).
Because Congress amended Section 2 to incorporate the "results test," Haddad
argues there is "direct evidence" that the Section 2 "results test" should apply to
Section 5 as well. Haddad, supra note 22, at 151. Haddad points out that the Senate
Judiciary Committee's Report accompanying the amendment to Section 2 indicates
that "f[in light of the amendment to section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate section
2." Id. at 149-50.
The conclusion reached by Justice Stevens and Mr. Haddad is not without
criticism. Justice Thomas, dissenting in Morse, criticized the conclusion that the parameters of Section 2 and Section 5 are necessarily coterminous. Noting the "patent
discrepancy" between the scope of Section 2, which by its terms refers to "the political processes leading to nomination or election," and the scope of Section 5, which is
limited by its reliance on the definition of "vote" found in Section 14 (limiting "vote"
to a primary, special, or general election), Justice Thomas concluded that "[als long
as [Section] 5 contains the term 'voting' and [Section] 14 in turn defines that word, I
think we must adhere to the specific definition provided in [Section] 14." Morse, 116
S. Ct. at 1236 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
225. See Morse, 116 S.Ct. at 1201.
226. See id. at 1202. The Court in Morse explained the purpose of the Voting
Rights Act by noting that:
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1964 [sic] because it concluded
that case-by-case enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment, as exemplified
by the history of the white primary in Texas, had proved ineffective to
stop discriminatory voting practices in certain areas of the country on
account of the intransigence of officials who "resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal
court decrees."
Id. at 1202-03. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 335).
The Morse Court explained that the purpose of the Section 5 preclearance was to put
an end to Southern intransigence. "By prohibiting officials in covered jurisdictions
from implementing any change in voting practices without prior approval from the
District Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General, [Congress] sought
to 'shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.'"Morse, 116 S.Ct. at 1202 (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328.).
See also H.R. REP. NO. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.CAN. 2437,
2439 (stating that "[a] salient obligation and responsibility of the Congress is to provide appropriate implementation of the guarantees of the 15th amendment to the
Constitution."); Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights,
42 VAND. L. REV. 1249 (1989). McDonald explains that "Congress acted in this unprecedented manner because the targeted states since the days of the Reconstruction
had systematically discriminated against blacks in voter registration, voting, and by
adopting official policies of racial segregation in other areas of public and private
life." Id. at 1251.
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ed that the history of the White Primary Cases as well 'as the
legislative history of the various extensions of Section 5 support
the inclusion of political party activity, particularly the nominating convention, within Section 5's coverage."
C. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and O'Connor concurred in the judgment of the court. Justice Breyer determined
by negative implication that Congress could not have possibly
intended the result which the Party asked the Court to read
into Section 5.2' The concurring opinion stated that "[i]n
1965, to have read this Act as excluding all political party activity would have opened a loophole in the statute the size of a

227. Justice Stevens concluded that conventions and primaries are virtually the
same for the purposes of determining Section 5 coverage. "The distinction between a
primary and a nominating convention is just another variation in electoral practices
that [Section] 5 was intended to cover." Morse, 116 S.Ct. at 1203.
Additionally, the Court found that Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), provided direct support for the proposition that nominating conventions are covered under
Section 5. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1203-04. In Terry, the Court ruled that the Jaybird
primary, a privately run nomination process in which the State had no involvement,
excluded blacks from voting for candidates to be placed on the primary election ballot. Thus, the Jaybird primary violated the Fifteenth Amendment. See Terry, 345 U.S.
at 469-70. In Morse, Justice Stevens, referring to the Jaybird primary as the
"equivalent of the Party's nominating convention," concluded that "[i]f the Jaybird's
nominating process violated the Fifteenth Amendment because black voters were not
permitted to participate, despite the entirely voluntary nature of the Jaybird association, then [Section] 5-which requires preclearance of all practices with the potential
to discriminate-must cover the Party's exclusion of voters from its convention."
Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1204.
Under Section 5, the issue of whether a change that is subject to preclearance
will have the purpose or effect of discriminating on account of color, race, or membership in a language minority, is reserved to the judgment of the Attorney General or
the District Court for the District of Columbia. See NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 181 (1985); McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 250 (1983);
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 384-85 (1971); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544, 570-71 (1968). The standard of review for the court in deciding a challenge
based on a failure to preclear, such as in Morse, is not whether the change in voting
will result in discrimination, but rather whether "the challenged alteration has the
potential for discrimination." Morse, 116 S.Ct. at 1204 (citing Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. at 181 (1985)); see also McDonald, supra note 7, at 38 (more
often than not the success or failure of a submission under Section 5 "turn[s] on the
failure of the jurisdiction to carry its burden of proof, rather than on a positive finding of discrimination by the courts or the Attorney General.").
228. See Morse, 116 S.Ct. at 1213-14 (Breyer, J., concurring).

1997]

MORSE V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VIRGINIA

243

mountain."229 The concurring opinion found some support in

the legislative history for the proposition that Congress did not
intend to exclude political party activity from Section 5's coverage. Indeed, the concurrence argued that Congress was acutely
aware of the discriminatory practices of Southern political parties with respect to the operation of nominating conventionsY °
In light of the legislative history of the Act and the state
action doctrine applicable to political party activities as established in the White Primary Cases, the concurring opinion rejected the notion that "in 1965 Congress intended its words to
place even a party's convention-based, all white evasive maneuvers beyond the statute's reach.""' Finally, the concurring
opinion deferred the exact scope of the Court's ruling in Morse
to future cases: "In this case, I conclude that this Court has not
decided the exact boundaries that the Constitution draws
around the subcategory of party rules subject to [Section] 5.
Further definition should await another day."s 2

229. See id. at 1213 (Breyer, J., concurring).
230. See id. at 1214 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that Congress was well aware
of the fact that Mississippi had excluded blacks from its nominating conventions, precinct meetings, and caucuses selecting delegates to the Democratic National Convention just years before the enactment of the Voting Rights Act). Justice Breyer relied
on a statement by Representative Bingham during the debate on the Voting Rights
Act that "to be most effective, [the Act] should include express coverage of party functions which directly, or indirectly, affect the primary or general elections in any
State." Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1214 (Breyer, J., concurring) (alterations in original).
231. Id. at 1214 (Breyer, J., concurring). The concurring opinion argued that the
Court need not go further than determining that Congress could not have intended to
exclude political party activity such as that at issue here from the coverage of Section 5's preclearance requirements. Specifically, the concurring opinion noted that the
Court need not decide "when party activities are, in effect, substitutes for state nominating primaries because the case before us involves a nominating convention that
resembles a primary about as closely as one could imagine." Id. at 1214-15 (Breyer,
J., concurring). Additionally, Justice Breyer explained that the Court need not decide
exactly which party activities at a convention fall within the coverage of Section 5.
Justice Breyer noted that Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 502 U.S. 491, 502-03
(1992) clearly delineated the categories of voting changes that are subject to
preclearance. See Morse 116 S. Ct. at 1215 (Breyer, J., concurring). Lastly, Justice
Breyer concluded that the Court need not decide the First Amendment freedom of
association claims raised by Justice Scalia's dissent, because "[tihose questions . . .
are properly left for a case that squarely presents them." Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
232. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1216 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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D. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented on the basis that subjecting political parties to Section 5 preclearance
requirements implicated First Amendment freedom of association concerns. 3 Justice Scalia argued that the Court's decision, holding political parties subject to Section 5, in turn renders the First Amendment's freedom of association (belonging to
all political parties) subject to a "permit system." In this regard,
Justice Scalia concluded that the "Court thus makes citizens
supplicants in the exercise of their First Amendment
rights."2
Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice, also dissented
on the basis that "[Section] 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not
reach all entities or individuals who might be considered the
State for constitutional purposes."' Justice Kennedy viewed
the Party's delegate filing fee as beyond the terms of Section 5.
He explained that where Congress sought to "distinguish between the State and other actors,""5 it demonstrated its ability to do so." Justice Kennedy concluded that the language of

233. See id. at 1216-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally Democratic Party of United
States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419
U.S. 477 (1975); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (cited by Justice Scalia for the
proposition that the Court has "always treated government assertion of control over
the internal affairs of political parties ...
as a matter of the utmost constitutional
consequence," Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1215 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); Ray v. Blair, 343
U.S. 214, 220 (1951) (discussing the internal affairs of political parties generally);
Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RIGHTS J. 1 (1995); Weisburd, supra note 181; Stephen E. Gottlieb, Rebuilding the Right of Association: The Right to Hold a Convention as a Test Case, 11
HoFsTRA L. REv. 191 (1982).
235. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1220 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
236. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
237. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(a)-(b) (1994) (making it "unlawful for any person acting
under color of law to fail or refuse to permit any person who is entitled to vote under specified provisions of the Act, or to willfully fail or refuse to tabulate, count, and
report such person's vote." (emphasis added)). Justice Kennedy concluded that:
[tihere is no apparent reason why the "under color of law" requirement
of [Section 11, 42 U.S.C. § 1973i] should not also be considered coterminous with the state action requirement of the Amendment that the statute enforces, and we should infer from Congress' employment of that requirement an intent to distinguish between the State and those other
actors to whom the governmental status must be imputed in some in-
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Section 5, read in conjunction with the other provisions of the
Act, rendered incomprehensible the notion that "Congress
meant to include the Democratic and Republican Parties when
it used the simple word 'State' in the Voting Rights Act."'
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia (and Justices Kennedy and Rehnquist regarding the portion of his dissent dealing
with Section 10), wrote the most comprehensive of the dissenting opinions. Justice Thomas based his dissent on the plain
meaning of Section 5.9 For Justice Thomas, the preliminary
question in determining whether the preclearance requirement
of Section 5 is triggered is whether the entity affecting the
change sought to be made subject to Section 5 is a State or
political subdivision.' He argued that both the plain meaning
of the statute, as well as the jurisprudential gloss that the
Court has placed on the terms "State" and "political subdivision" in previous voting rights cases, augues against including a
political party within the meaning of those terms."
While the Court has broadly interpreted the types of entities
subject to coverage under Section 5 in cases such as

stances. Congress knows the difference between regulating States and
other actors, and in [Section] 5 chose only to regulate the States.
Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1220 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
238. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1221 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
239. See id. at 1222 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas framed the issue of
the case accordinglyTwo discrete questions of statutory interpretation control appellants' claim
under [Section] 5 of the Voting Rights Act: whether the Republican Party
of Virginia is a 'State or political subdivision! and, if so, whether the fee
imposed upon its conventioneers constitutes a procedure "with respect to
voting." The plain meaning of the Voting Rights Act mandates a negative
answer to both of these questions.
Id. (Thomas; J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
240. See id. at 1222 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
241. See id. at 1222-34 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581
(1994) (holding that a vote dilution challenge could not be maintained under Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act with respect to the size of a government body), Justice
Thomas, concurring in the judgment of the Court, gave a scathing criticism of the
Court's previous reading of Section 2 so as to permit vote dilution claims in particular, and the Court's willingness to expand ad infinitum the mandates of the Act in
general. Justice Thomas, argued that a "systematic reassessment" of the Court's Section 2 jurisprudence was in order. See id. at 2591 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Thomas argued that he could "no longer adhere to a reading of the Act that does not
comport with the terms of the statute and that has produced such a disastrous misadventure in judicial policy-making. Id. at 2592 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Sheffield,242 Justice Thomas argued that the issue in Sheffield,
and in nearly all other Section 5 cases, was whether a particular type of governmental entity fell within Section 5's coverage. 2' Accordingly, Justice Thomas concluded that "[t]he
terms 'State' and 'political subdivision' should both be construed
to refer solely to the various territorial divisions within a larger
unit of territorially-defined government."' Justice Thomas rejected the notion that the Party acted as an "organ of the
State," and thereby rejected the state action principles relied on
by the majority.' Finding the plain meaning of Section 5
clear and unambiguous, Justice Thomas asserted that there was
no reason for the Court to defer to the Attorney General's regulation requiring preclearance of voting changes effectuated by
political parties.'

242. United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 118 (holding that Section 5
"applies to all entities having power over any aspect of the electoral process within
designated jurisdictions.").
243. See Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1226 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Whether or not
Sheffield was correct as an original matter, it stands, at most, for the proposition
that a local unit of government, like a city, may be considered the 'State' for purposes of [Section] 5."). See supra note 4 for Supreme Court cases construing Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act.
244. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1223 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Sheffield, 435 U.S.
at 126 (holding that "s]ince the States or political subdivisions 'with respect to which'
[Section] 4(a)'s duties apply are entire territories and not just county governments or
the units of local governments that register voters, [Section] 5 must, it would seem,
apply territorially as well.").
245. Justice Thomas concluded that:
[Tihe Republican Party of Virginia is not an organ of the State through
which the State must conduct its affairs, and the Party has no authority
to formulate state law ....
This common sense understanding also
explains why virtually every one of this Court's [Section] 5 cases has
involved a challenge to, or a request for approval of, action undertaken
by a State or a unit of state government.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
246. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). "In light of the plain meaning of the phrase
'State or political subdivision,' I see no reason to defer to the Attorney General's regulation interpreting that statute to cover political parties." Id.; see also Chevron USA
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that while
an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to great deference,
when Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue ...
the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."); SINGER, supra note 136, § 49.05; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its
Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 301 (1988).
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Justice Thomas also rejected the Court's dismissal of the
"only precedent on the applicability of [Section] 5 to political
parties. " ' In Williams v. Democratic Party," the Supreme
Court summarily affirmed the decision of the district court that
Section 5 did not apply to the Georgia Democratic Party's
change in procedures for nominating delegates to the Democratic National Convention. 9 Believing that the Supreme Court's
affirmance of Williams was "entitled to precedential weight,"20
Justice Thomas approvingly cited the decision of the district
court for the proposition that "[t]he Act does not refer to actions
by political parties but refers to actions by a 'State or political
subdivision."2 ' In Thomas' opinion, because a political party
cannot be considered a State or a political subdivision under
the terms of Section 5, the Republican Party of Virginia's delegate filing fee should not be subject to Section 5 preclearance.
Addressing the White Primary Cases and the state action
doctrine, Justice Thomas considered what he viewed as the
"only conceivable basis in law for deeming the acts of the Party
to be those of the State." 52 Justice Thomas, however, rejected
the proposition that "the meaning of the statutory term 'State'
in [Section] 5 is necessarily coterminous with the constitutional
doctrine of state action."' Justice Thomas noted that "[there
is a marked contrast between the language of [Section] 5 and
other federal statutes that we have read to be coextensive with
the constitutional doctrine of state action."' Because other
portions of the Voting Rights Act contain the language which
Congress has traditionally used to denote the inclusion of the
constitutional state action doctrine,-"acting under color of
law"-Justice Thomas argued that Section 5 should not be read
as being coextensive with the state action doctrine. "Where
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is gener-

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
phasis
252.
253.
254.

Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1225 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Civ. Action No. 16286 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 1972), affd, 409 U.S. 809 (1972).
See id.
Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1225 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Civ. Action No. 16286, slip op. at 4) (emadded).
Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1228 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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ally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion." 5
In addition, Justice Thomas found that inclusion of the
Party's delegate filing fee is not consistent with the "public
function" test adopted by the Court in previous state action
cases. 6 The public function doctrine provides that "'the relevant question is not simply whether a private group is serving
a public 'function.' Instead, '[wie have held that the question is
whether the function performed has been 'traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the State."" Justice Thomas, quoting
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 8 further noted that "it is only 'the
conduct of the elections themselves [that] is an exclusively public function."'' 9
Even if the Party could be considered a State in the statutory
or constitutional sense, Justice Thomas concluded that the
Court wrongly decided this case because charging a delegate
filing fee as a prerequisite for participation in a state nominating convention does not constitute a change with respect to
voting.2" Justice Thomas rejected the assertion that the delegate filing fee at issue is a change with respect to voting
because: (1) Section 14 of the Act defines "vote or voting" as
actions relating only to "primary, special or general elections;"26 ' (2) other federal election statutes specifically mention
conventions in their coverage, and as a result "Congress obviously knows how to cover nominating conventions when it

255. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,
23 (1983)); see Fortune v. Kings County Democratic County Comm., 598 F. Supp. 761,
762 (implying a right of action based on context of section and mandate that Act be
liberally construed).
256. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1231 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
257. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842
(1982)); see Ronna Greff Schneider, The 1982 State Action Trilogy: Doctrinal Contraction, Confusion, and a Proposal for Change, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1150 (1985)
(discussing the perceived retreat of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger
with respect to the state action doctrine from the relatively expansive interpretation
of the doctrine under the Vinson and Warren Courts).
258. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
259. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1231 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Brooks, 436 U.S.
at 158).
260. See id. at 1234 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
261. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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wants to;" 262 and (3) contrary to the contentions of the majority, there is a functional difference between conventions and
primaries.2"
VI.

CONCLUSION-IPLICATIONS OF THE MORSE DECISION

The question Morse does not answer is: What now? A splintered Supreme Court, with three factions and five separate opinions, struggled to find the Republican Party of Virginia and its
delegate filing fee subject to Section 5 preclearance. Just as the
Court struggled, those trying to understand the exact foundations and parameters of the decision are left to grapple with
the Court's decision.
The Morse decision is unfortunate not because it is necessarily an expansion of Section 5 jurisprudence, nor because it
marks in some way a retreat from what has been perceived as
a tightening of the Court's reading of Section 5. Rather, the
Court's decision in Morse is unfortunate because of its complete
departure from the text of Section 5 in finding political parties
subject to preclearance. The Supreme Court has consistently
read Section 5 expansively. This expansive approach, was nevertheless founded in the statute's express mandates. The broad
reading of Section 5 with respect to types of governmental entities subject to preclearance makes sense. A State attempting to
change its voting laws is certainly subject to the commands of
the preclearance requirement. The Court has also appropriately
construed the term "political subdivision" to include virtually all
forms of local government entities. As the Court noted in United States v. Board of Commissioners,2" the statutory language
would be emasculated if the term "political subdivision," as it is
defined in Section 14,2" applied only to a "county or parish."2" The terms "State or political subdivision" operate
territorially with respect to the types of entities within "covered" jurisdictions that are subject to preclearance." 7

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. at 1234-35 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1235 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
435 U.S. 110 (1978).
See supra note 36.
Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 117-18.
Id. at 118.
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The broad reading of Section 5 regarding the types of changes in voting practices subject to preclearance also makes sense.
The Court recently affirmed the principle, first established in
Allen v. State Board of Elections,2" that Section 5 was "intended to reach any state enactment which altered the election
law of a covered state in even a minor way."269 In Presley v.
Etowah County Commission,27 ° the Court relied on this language from Allen, which incidentally supports the proposition
that Section 5 applies only to governmental entities, reiterating
the view that changes proposed by covered jurisdictions are
subject to preclearance only if they relate to "voting."2 71 Allen

and its companion cases provide the framework for determining
which types of changes in fact pertain to voting: (1) changes
involving the manner of voting; (2) changes affecting the requirements and qualifications for candidacy; (3) changes relating to the composition of the electorate; and (4) changes creating or abolishing an elective office. 72 Again, the statutory
language and the judicial gloss given the preclearance requirement make this reading of Section 5 a reasonable accommodation of the language and purposes of the Voting Rights Act.
The legislative history of the Act and the several extensions
also lend support to the expansive reading that the Court has
heretofore given the terms of Section 5. Congress was well
aware of the determination of southern states and political
subdivisions in trying to evade unfavorable court decrees.273
Because of the ineffectiveness of the case-by-case method, Congress responded in a "permissibly decisive manner,'
by requiring those states with track records of voting discrimination
to preclear any proposed changes in their voting laws or procedures.

268. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
269. Id. at 566.
270. 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
271. See id. at 501-02.
272. See id.
273. See H.R. REP. No. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in U.S.C.CAN 2437, 2439 (noting
that the "history of the 15th Amendment litigation in the Supreme Court reveals
both the variety of means used to bar Negro voting and the durability of such discriminatory policies").
274. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966).
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Bringing political parties within the scope of Section 5 is,
however, a wholly different matter. In terms of statutory construction, the Supreme Court took a giant leap in reading the
terms "State or political subdivision" to somehow include political parties. Indeed, the two opinions in Morse supporting the
outcome of the case barely attempt to justify the inclusion of
political parties within Section 5 based on the language of the
statute. When Justice Stevens does so, he reaches beyond Section 5, for in Section 5 there is no support for such a reading.
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, ignores the language of the
statute altogether.
A strange result then is reached in an even stranger fashion.
Regardless of one's belief as to the appropriate outcome of
Morse, Justice Thomas accurately described the nature of the
case.2 75 Morse, first and foremost, is a case of statutory construction; do the terms "State or political subdivision" as they
are used in Section 5 include within their meaning political
parties? Other considerations, such as the legislative history,
the historical backdrop within which the Eighty-ninth Congress
operated, the precedential weight of the White Primary Cases,
and the deference due the Attorney General's regulation, take
their appropriate places in the interpretative landscape. Yet,
when called upon to interpret the meaning of the words of the
statute, it is those very words which the five members of the
"majority" give short shrift.
The irony of the Morse decision is that if the Republican
Party had chosen the route of a primary, which it had the
option of doing under Virginia law,2 76 no filing fee would have
been necessary. Under the primary method, however, there
would have been nearly complete state involvement, including
expenditures from the public fisc. In choosing a method of
nomination whereby the Party could eschew financial reliance
on the State, the Party took on the role of a state actor when it
charged a filing fee.277 In attempting to operate outside the
shadow of state involvement, an ideologically attractive option

275. Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1222 (1996) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
276. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-509(B) (Michie 1993).
277. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1214-15.
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for the Republican Party of Virginia, the Party instead became
an agent of the state and as a result, became subject to Section
5.
While potentially expansive in its reach, the implications of
the Supreme Court's decision in Morse are likely to be minimal.
The division among the members of the Court, the First
Amendment freedom of association concerns acknowledged by
all five opinions in Morse, and the cautionary statements of the
members that voted to include the Party's delegate filing fee
under Section 5's coverage, indicate that Morse, while representing an expansion of the preclearance requirement, will not
have a significant impact on voting rights cases.
One potentially expansive result of the decision arises from
the rule that it is not proven discriminatory changes which are
subject to preclearance, but rather potentially discriminatory
changes. In this regard the Court failed to adequately describe
how the Party's delegate filing fee, which was required of all
convention-goers, was potentially discriminatory. The Court
seems willing to include administrative mechanisms implemented by private entities, such as a filing fee, which facilitate
the administration of a nominating process without relying on
state funding or intervention, within the coverage of Section 5's
preclearance requirements.
While Morse does not adequately answer the question, "what
now?," the various factions of the Court and their splintered
views may provide some insight as to the implications of Morse
on political party coverage under Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act. The concurring opinion is the proper starting place. In that
opinion, Justice Breyer concluded that the "Court has not decided the exact boundaries that the Constitution draws around the
subcategory of party rules subject to [Section] 5. "27S

"What now?" can perhaps best be answered by reference to.
what the three members concurring in the judgment determined need not be decided in Morse. It was the questions that
the Court chose not to address which will most likely confront
it in the future. The concurring opinion concluded that the
precise questions which a political party will likely ask itself

278. Id. at 1216 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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after reading Morse need not be resolved. Justice Breyer noted
that the Court "need not go further in determining when party
activities are, in effect, substitutes for state nominating .primaries. " " The concurring opinion declined to answer 'just which
party nominating convention practices fall within the scope of
the Act."' Finally, the Court postponed further clarification
on the regulation of party activities under Section 5's
preclearance requirements because "First Amendment questions
about the extent to which the Federal Government, through
preclearance procedures, can regulate the workings of a political
party convention, are difficult ones.""' It is ironic that those
members of the Court who extended the scope of Section 5 to
new realms on the one hand, felt compelled on the other to
show judicial restraint in exercising their expansive interpretation.
Two aspects of the Morse decision provide guidance in predicting the answers to the questions which the Court felt constrained to address. First, when one of the unanswered questions in Morse presents itself for judicial resolution in the Supreme Court, Morse will be instructive in determining which
members of the Court assume a pivotal role. The four dissenters in Morse concluded for various reasons that Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act did not apply to political parties. Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg, on the other hand, determined that
political parties were, under the terms of the Attorney
General's regulation, subject to Section 5. Justices Breyer,
O'Connor, and Souter made their roles pivotal by deciding that
Congress could not conceivably have intended to exclude the
delegate filing fee from preclearance, while refusing to further
define the conditions under which a political party must
preclear.
The alignment of the members of the Court leads to the
second aspect of the Morse decision which aids in understanding its implications on political party activity. The concurring
opinion, in recognizing that some "party nominating convention

279. Id. at 1214 (Breyer, J., concurring).
280. Id. at 1215 (Breyer, J., concurring).
281. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
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practices" 82 are subject to preclearance, also recognized the
limitations "as to which voting related 'practices and
procedures' must be precleared."2 ' These limitations are articulated in Allen " and Presley.2 8 Only those changes which
pertain to "voting" are subject to preclearance. 8 Furthermore,
Presley instructs that the history of the Court's Section 5 cases
suggests that there are four general categories of changes with
respect to voting which are subject to preclearance. 7 The concurring opinion in Morse in turn instructs that the "substantial"
limitation on the applicability of Section 5 to States and political subdivisions, as articulated in Presley, similarly applies to
the applicability of Section 5 to political parties. 21 While providing some guidance for future cases regarding political party
activities and preclearance, the most obvious and disturbing
question that must be asked is where does a delegate filing fee
to a nominating convention fall within these categories, for it
does not very neatly fit within any.
Justice Breyer, perhaps inadvertently, places further limitations on the extent to which political party activity is subject to
Section 5. One of the questions he declines to answer in Morse
is "which party nominating convention practices fall within the
scope of the Act."289 This is very different from asking "which
party practices fall within the scope of the Act." The importance
of the words "party nominating convention practices," as distinguished from "party practices," is potentially significant. If
the Republican Party of Virginia charges a fee of twenty-five to
thirty-five dollars as a prerequisite for members to join its
ranks in a year when it chooses its candidates in a primary
election, must the fee be precleared. If the answer turns on the
plain meaning of "which party nominating convention practices
fall within the scope of the Act," the answer must surely be no.

282.
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284.
285.
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288.

Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
Allen v. State Bd. of Educ., 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
See id. at 501-02.
See id. at 502-03.
Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1215 (1996) (Breyer, J., concur-

ring).
289. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
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As five members of the Morse Court demonstrated, however,

the plain meaning of certain words is of little import.

Matthew M. Farley

